Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1976

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the
Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. . Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 43. Powell
Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

~~·:cr

( ~~k

'P~J+J II~~ C::--~ ~~' ~ \

(

6...

~

"-4;.._

~ ..,f---

~fa~.,)-.
~ ~/·..,~
~'I ~ Ji'. ..::ti./.J ~I v-c,,c..l.f.. 1 ~

~~ ~~~ /G....tv.~,.th· J
~
.a.t~ ~.
-~ ~~~4(.... ~ ..... - ~

{ .-,o

) 1M/'V

~(1/-.L,Jv

1

4,. I

t~

tJ.,c. w

~ t-1-"

a.;t- ~ .;-.. -zz. ~

ZACCHINI

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, to Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S
448, this case presents a conflict between the tort of "appropriation" or
"right of publicity" privacy and the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.

-

~------------------Petr is a "human cannonball."
2.
FACTS:

His act, which

was originated by his father and performed only by his family for 50 years,
consists of being blasted from a cannon into a net 200 feet away.

The

In August 1972 petr was performing at a county fair in Burton,
Ohio.

His act was staged in a grandstand area for the pleasure of

anyone attending the fair.

There was no separate admission for petr's

performance, and it is unclear whether petr received a percentage of the
general gate receipts.
One night a reporter for WEWS, resp's television station,

1/
attended the fair.-

Petr noticed the reporter's camera and asked him

not to film the performance.

The reporter complied, but returned the

-

following day on orders from his producer and videotaped the entire
performance.

e~veno'clock

WEWS broadcast the act on its

news program

that night, accompanied by commentary describing the act as a "true
spectator sport . . • a thriller" and "you really need to see it in
person • • • to appreciate it . .

II

Pet. A57.

Petr sued for invasion of privacy, contending that resp had
appropriated his professional talents.

The trial court granted resp's

motion for summary judgment without opinion, but the state CA reversed.
The Ohio Supreme Court . held that petr's complaint made out a
valid claim for invasion of privacy.
as a ( !ight

o! publici~"
...,

The Supreme Court characterized this

"a right of exclusive control over the

publicity given to his performances

II

The court went on to assume

that petr's public performance did not constitute an abandonment of his
right of publicity beyond the limits of the fair.
The court then turned to "[t]he decisive issue in the case •
whether the defendant TV station had a privilege to film and televise
the plaintiff's performance, on its nightly news program

!/

II

An affidavit by the photographer-reporter accompanying the motion
for summary judgment alleged that "news reporters and cameramen are
admitted to the fair by its promoters without charge in order to permit
news coverage and generate publicity for the fair." Pet. A54-56.

Reviewing this Court's decisions in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, and

~

New York Times v. Sullivan, the court concluded that
"[j]ust as the press was held to be privileged to report
matters which would otherwise be private, . • . [t]he
same privilege exists in cases where appropriation of a
right of publicity is claimed, and the privilege may
properly be said to be lost where the actual intent of
the publication is not to give publicity to matters of
legitimate public concern . . • . The proper standard must
~/
necessarily be whether the matters reported were of public
I~D
interest, and if so, the press will be liable for appropri~
at i o n- of a performer's right of publicity only if its actual
n
,
~~ intent was not to report the performance, but, rather, to
~~ appropriate the performance for some other private use, or
~ ·"' if the actual intent was to injure the performer."
The privilege remained intact in this case.

The court thought petr's

performance was a matter of legitimate public interest, which resp treated

r-----------------------------------------------

as such, as evidenced by its use of the film only once, and then in conjunction with one of its nightly news broadcasts.
Justice Celebrezze complained in dissent that the majority overlooked Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, and that summary judgment was improper because of unresolved issues of material fact, among
them whether petr was a public figure and whether resp's broadcast of
petr's act was prompted by commercial motives.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr amplifies the dissent, arguing that

there are no considerations of free public debate which motivated the
New York

~imes

test.

Indeed that standard is inapplicable where the

claim is for appropriation, not defamatory falsehood.

Petr argues that

since he is clearly not a public figure Gertz mandates far less First

I

Amendment protection for resp.
Resp maintains that both the substantive cause of action and
the privilege in this case are solely state common-law creations, which in
any event have an independent basis in Ohio constitutional law.

Resp

also argues that petr is a public figure and that the state supreme court's

test is consistent with New York Times and its progency.

Finally, resp

notes that the facts of this case are unique, that performers

ordinarily

have adequate means to control media coverage and so safeguard their
right of publicity, and that resp's use of the film was de minimis.

4.

DISCUSSION:

Though the state supreme court does not

give us the location of the "privilege" as clearly as it might, the court
cites and discusses only First Amendment cases by this Court.

The opinion

is an attempt to accommodate the Ohio law of defamation with First
Amendment guarantees.

Since the result is predicated solely on resp's

First Amendment defense, we have jurisdiction under §1257(3).
On the merits, petr cannot bring his case squarely within any
of the relevant precedents because the privacy interest he is asserting
has not yet been addressed by this Court in the First Amendment context.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, a "false light" privacy case, the Court
J)
~

\,\

held that factually erroneous statements about matters of public interest
deserved New York Times protection, even though the plaintiffs in Hill
were apparently private individuals.

In Gertz, a defamation case, the

New York Times standard was held too stringent a . protection for defamatory
falsehoods about private individuals.

The Court rejected the "general

or public interest" distinction as a means for determining the con, stitutional protection to be given defamatory publications.

This appeared

to inter Time, Inc. v. Hill, but Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,
~

419 U.S. 245, 250-51, another "false light" privacy case, revivified it

____________________ _____________

'by.' -reserving the question
whether "a State may constitutionally apply a

more relaxed standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of false
statements injurious to a private individual under a false-light theory
of invasion of privacy, or whether the constitutional standard announced
in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false-light cases."

While also reserving final judgment on Time, Inc. v. Hill, Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 & n.l9, indicated that different
constitutional standards may apply depending upon whether the tort action
is one for defamation, where New York Times defends against lawsuits by
public officials or public figures, or invasion of privacy, where the
inquiry is whether "the materials published, although assertedly private,
are 'matters of public interest.' "

See id. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring).

In Cox Broadcasting, a "public disclosure" privacy case, the Court found
it u necessary to reach
"the broader question whether truthful publications may ever
be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it
another way, whether the State may ever define and protect
an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the
press • • • . " 420 u.s. at 491.
The applicable constitutional test
formulated.

case has not yet been

New York Times is inapposite

this case has nothing

to do with defamatory falsehood, but with whether petr can forbid a
televised publication which is only too faithful to reality.

Though the

question is quite close to that reserved in Cox Broadcasting, this is not

\'

a report or comment on petr's performance; it is an ~appropriation, for
whatever purpose, of the entire act itself.

Indeed Cox Broadcasting, supra

at 489, recognizes that "right of publicity" actions may call into play
a wholly different analysis:

"we should recognize that we do not have

at issue here an action for the invasion of privacy involving the
appropriation of one's name or photograph •

II

Even though the state court found this to be a matter of public
interest, it would be a mistake to treat this as a "false light" privacy

-

case determined by the vitality of Time, Inc. v. Hill.
~ token,

By the same

it makes little sense to make the case turn on petr's status as a

public figure (of which there was no finding below).

The essence of the right which petr asserts is prevention of the

~

exploitation of someone who is presumably already in the public eye and
whose actions are matters of public interest.

Some of the key variables

would appear to be whether petr has contracted away his right with respect
to this performance, and whether resp's conduct constitutes an appropriation harmful to petr's commercial interests.
inadequate on both counts.

The record here is probably

It is also unclear to me that this case

presents a recurring problem, or that petr has any damages.
There is a response.
12/7/76
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TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

Gene Corney

RE:

No. 76-577, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO

The petition for cert poses the following question: "where a
performer has a protected right of publicity--the right of

exclusi~

control over his professional affairs--and that right is held as
a matter of state law to have been infringed by a television

.....--..

1
stat.-ion
s filming of his entire act over his specific objection,
..___...

and the broadcasting thereof on a nightly news show, is the television
station's tortious conduct immunized as a matter of law by the First
Amendment . . . . "

JURISDICTION:

Respondent suggests that this Court does not

have jurisdiction over the case in that there is an adequate and
independent state ground.

The thrust of this point is that the

Ohio Supreme Court based its decision on a state law privilege,
and that a state is of course free to give the press more protection
than that required by the First Amendment.

Thus, even if the First

Amendment does not require the result below, the state law privilege
does so require.
Given the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court, this contention
't
would ordinarily be easily resolved just b~ looking at it. But the
complication is, of course, the fact that only the syllabus necessarily

carries the approval of the Ohio Supreme Court.

And respondent

presses strongly the point that the syllabus does not mention
the first amendment.
I think it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction.

To

~

b egin with, this case seems to be on all fours with Perkins v.
Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, cited by respondent in its brief.
In that case, a foreign corporation temporarily carried on a continuous
but limited part of its general business in Ohio.

~

W~ile

enaged in

doing such business in Ohio, its president was served with a summons
in an action in personam against the corporation filed in an Ohio
state court by a nonresident of Ohio.

The cause of action did not

arise in Ohio and did not relate to the corporation's activities
in that state.

The trial court sustained a motion to quash the

service of summons.

The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.

makes no mention of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Its syllabus

It simply states

that the doing of business by this foreign corporation would not
make the corporation subject to service of process.

This Court

expressly recognized that "[i]fthe [syllabus] stood alone, it might
mean that the decision rested solely upon the law of Ohio."

Indeed,

I would note that there is nothing to prevent Ohio from establishing
procedural protections as to service of process above and beyond those
mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment.

But this Court stated that the

syllabus had to be read "in the light of the facts and issues of the
case,"

and found that the opinions in the case expressed the view

that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited Ohio from asserting jurisdiction
over the respondent corporation.

...·

This Court then concluded that "for

us to allow the judgment to stand as it is would risk an affirmance
of a decision which might have been decided differently if the Court
below had felt free, under our decisions, to do so."

The Court

proceeded in that case to determine that the Fourteenth Amendment
would not prohibit Ohio from asserting jurisdiction over the
foreign corporation.
This case seems to me to be in an identical posture,
in light of Perkins I see no

ba.r

-tD

and
reaching

the merits.

THE MERITS:

This is an interesting and important case, but

also one that is quite difficult.

Indeed, I find it hard to get

a fairly good grasp on the precise questions at issue.

In any event,

I am quite surprised to find the Court in the posture of deciding

1'~

what could be a very important First Amendment case without the aid
of interested amici such as broadcasters and newspapers.

For some

reason, the news media apparently does not realize that this case
has the potential of being a major First Amendment decision.
Before discussing the legal issues, I want to make one comment
about

the nature of the

state ~ created

right that is at issue here.

There has been some discussion in this case as to whether we are
dealing with a "right of privacy" or a "right of publicity."

In

my view they are in most contexts ~uch as thi~ two sides of the same

-

coin.

To use Justice Whiteis language in Cox Broadcasting, what

we are really confronted with is a state defined and protected
"area of privacy free from unwanted publicity."
"unwanted."

I emphasize the word

Some people consider a part of their lives "private"

and seek to avoid publicity as to that part of their lives because

a preference for privacy.

In that context, it seems appropriate

to talk about a right to privacy.
There are other situations in which an individual plans to
make a part of his life "open" to the public, but, perhaps for
reasons of commercial profit, the individual wants to control access
to what he intends to expose.

In that context, it seems appropriate

to talk of a "right of publicity."

In both cases the individual

seeks to limit exposure of his actions to the public.

The extent

and nature of the exclusion differs in the two contexts, but it
nonethless is essentially a right to exclude publication of a part
of one's life.
Where does the First Amendment fit into this scheme of
individual interests in limiting publication about one's life?
To begin with, it is worth emphasizing that the First Amendment does
not require that States recognize and protect areas of privacy
free from unwanted publicity.
~..........,....

....._

federal

Putting to one side other possible

I

constitutional constraints such as substantive due process,

the First Amendment leaves the States free to decide whether to
l

define and create an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity.
On the other hand, once

CL

State

does decide to create

such an area, the First Amendment must be considered in

dete~ng

whether there are federal constitutional limits on the

scope of the area of privacy created and enforced by the State.
In the instant case, it is clear from paragraph 2 of the syllabus

I

that the Ohio Suprme Court has recognized in the performer a

"right to the publicity value of his performance."

The question

for us is whether, and to what extent, the First Amendment requires

a privilege for legitimate news use of aspects of the performance.

None of our prior cases
that question.

~

~

directly applicable in resolving

I have reread the cases from New York Times v.

Sullivan through last Term's decision in Firestone, and I find them
4 ~ generally inagplicable. We are dealing in this case with an entirely
I~ ------~-----~~
v
•
~curate and comprehensile report of an o~viously newsworthy event.
........

:we

We are not confronted with questions of defamation, false light
privacy, public figure doctrine, or the scope of matters of public
interest.
~

Moreover,

we are not confronted here with appropriation
.....

for the purpose of commercial advertising or the use of aspects of
the performance to promote the sale of goods.

For reasons that will

appear shortly, I think the most relevant precedent is Cox

This Court specifically noted in Cox Broadcasting that it was
not addressing the question whether truthful publications may ever
be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it another way, whether
the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from
unwanted publicity in the press.

420 U.S. at 491.

we must address that question at least in part.

In this case

The reason I say

"in part" is quite important--we have before us a narrow statecre.ated area of privacy.

First of all, the State has not protected

this area of privacy--the performance--from all truthful publication.
The press is Still free to write about, describe, and criticize

I Zacchini's performance.

Zacchini

argues that the First Amendment

does not require that the State extend to news broadcaseters the
privilege of filming his entire performance and showing it on the
nightly news.

He apparently would not be concerned

if they

aired a still photograph of his coming out of the cannon or his
landing on the net.

The second narrow aspect to this case is that

the area which the State has defined to be private is limited to
performers.

:#

We ar~alking in this case, according to syllabus

#2, about the right

to the publicity value of a performance.

We are not confronted here with broader questions of the right
to film public figures performing private though newsworthy activities.
For example, we are not dealing here with whether the press could
tomorrow film the Secretary of State taking a stroll alongside the
B&O Canal while thinking about the problems of the nation.
I stress these points because I think they have relevance to
the First Amendment balance.

On the one side, the fact that this

mse involves a limitation on the nature and extent of media coverage
rather than a complete ban on discussion is something to be considered.
Of course, one might argue that this cuts the other way if there is
any meaning to the argument that a picture is worth a thousand
words.

On the other side of the balance there is, when one considers

only "performances", a legitimate state interest that may not be

.

present

'
~n

other contexts.

The state interest is analagous to

the interest which underlies our federal copyright and patent

give to the performer the right to decide whether and how much
publicity he needs by giving him the right to control publicity.
Although these are relevant considerations, the tough question is
one of result.

7
Determining the final result in this case is complicated
somewhat by the factual situation, so I will start down the road
with a few

hypotheticals.

Suppose a performer gets
play, rents a small theater,

copyright protection on a
and performs the play.

He allows

admission only for a fee, he bars the use of tape recorders
and note pads and pencils, and allows pursuant to contract one
T.V. network to film the performance for the purpose of live T.V.
transmission to local stations.

F~ Amendment problems.

So far there are no real

The First Amendment does not require

that the press be admitted free of charge.

It does not require

that the press be entitled to bring in tape recorders or even
note pads.

It does not require that the performer contract with

a T.V. network for live transmission;

and if he does so, it does

not require that he provide the same opportunity to all networks.
The press can report the play.
can criticize it.

They can describe it.

They

They cannot reproduce it word for word since it

is a copyrighted production.

But there is in copyright the

doctrine of fair use, which allows a relative short or small portion
of a copyrighted work to be used without authorization from the
copyright owner if the user has a valid reason to do so and
the use does not adversely affect the

owner's interests.

[A common example of fair use is a quotation in a book review.]
The roots of the fair use doctrine in the copyright area are
obscure, but they have not--to my knowledge--been developed under
the First Amendment and its interrelationship with the copyrights
clause.

Now suppose the performance is something that cannot be

JtJ

copyrighted,
........

_...

\

It could be a pro6fessional fight or a human

~

cannonball.

Again the performer can exclude all those except

those willing to pay admission, and he can sell live TV rights.
Suppose

he decides not to have his performance, or a tape thereof,

aired on any T.V. show.
prohibition on

Nonethless a TV station, aware of his

videotaping, sneaks in and tapes the performance.

,.4..

It then airia small portion of the performance on the evening news
as part of the entertainment news of the day.

Can the State

use its power to enforce a tort judgment against the TV station

o~ehalf

of the producer, or does that infringe the First Amendment?

-

There are three possible answers.
First Amendment.

First, it does infringe the

The press should be free to attempt to get

access for the purpose of taping things like this, and they should

~I

It

.is important to stress cannot be copyrighted.

For

if the performance can be copyrighted and has not been copyrighted,
there is a preemption

issue--at ~ least

a potential issue--if the State

,-..

th1rough its tort law gives a "property
could have been but was not copyrighted.

right" to something that

not be subject to civil liability for the act of publication.

This

performance is in the public domain, just as the records in Cox
Broadcasting were public records.

Once a performer decides to

place his performance in the public domain, the press can film it
and display it without being subected to civil liability by the
State.

Moreover, since the State cannot establish civil liability

for the act of publicity, it cannot establish an independent liability
for the act of having violated the producer's restrictions on filming.
[There might be exceptions to this position, not relevant here,
where the act of filming or taking pictures with flash bulbs actually
intereferes with the performance.]

2 . The second approach is to conclude that it is not inconsistent
with the First Amendment for the State to establish civil liability
in this context.

This position would emphasize that we left open

in Cox the extent to which a state could define and protect an area
of privacy free from unwanted truthful publicity.
not require us to resolve that broad question.

This case does

All we need say

is that with respect to performances, the State interest in protecting

-------------------------------~
private
citizens and their valuable publi~y rights in entertainment
~
~------------------------justifies
this particular restriction
on the media.

------------

~ . Finally,

the third approach would be to take a case by case

balancing approach, using the factors that have been developed in
~

'-

the application of the fair use doctrine in copyright law.
c

.....

factors include:

These

"""* - - -

(l)):he extent to whichthe use is in competition

with the copyright owner and affects his market; (2) The size and
relative importance of the part used;

(3) the nature of the

performance; and (4) The user's reasons for appropriating the work
and for not seeking permission.

/0

My present incliniation is to go with the second alternative.
As you have noted in a different context--Gertz--there is not much

---

-

to be said in favor of the case-by-case approach. And as between
..-.....,____._
the first and second alternatives, in this limited area the

-

---

state interest which is analagous to the interest that underlises
our copyright laws seems to me sufficient to justify this infringement
of First Amendment freedoms.
Application of that approach to this case is complicated.
First, if we are willing to allow the State to give Zacchini a
property right

the publicity value of his performance

that is not subject to a news privilege as to videotaped reproductions,
we have to determine whether he retained that right or passsed it
'---

m to the producers who ran the county fair.

This is an important

inquiry, since it appears that the producers gave news people free
mmission to the fair, while Zacchini told the film crew not to film
his act.

In circumsatnces such as this, we don't want the press

to have to guess as to who really holds the property right and what
the owner of the right wants to do with it.

Here however the press

could have checked on this during the intervening day between the
first attempt to film and the actual filming.

Moreover,

to

fuis point everyone seems to have assumed that Zacchini had the
property right.

Subject to further rethinking,

it might be best to just treat the case as one in which Zacchini
hid the right.
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FIRST DRAFT
No. 76-577 -:- Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Hugo Zacchini, . is an entertainer.

He ·

per~orms . a "human cannonball" act in which he is shot from

a cannon into a net some 200 feet away.
occupies some 15 seconds.

Each performance

In August and September,. 1972,

petitioner was engaged to perform his act on
at the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio.

a

regular basis

lie p.e rformed in a

fenced area, surrounded by grandstands, at the fair grounds.
Members of the public attending the fair were not charged a
separate admission fee to observe his act.
On August 30, a free lance reporter for Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Company, the operator of a television broadcasting
station and respondept in this case, attended the fair.
carried a small movie . camera.

th~t

He

Petitioner noticed the reporter

and asked him not ·to film the performance.
do so · on

'*· :

The reporter did not

day; but on the instructions of the producer of

respondent's daily newscast, he returned the following day and

.., ..
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vi,deotaped .the entire act.

This film clip, approximately 15

seconds in .length, was shown ori the 11:00 o'clock news program

.

1/ .

that: night, ·together with favorable comrtlentary.
Petit.ioner them brought this. action for damages, alleging
that he is "engaged in the entertainment business," that the act
he performs is one "invented by his · father and . • • performed
only by his family for the last. SO years," that respondent · "showed
·and .c orrimercialized the film of his .act without · his consent," and
that such conduct was an "unlawful appropriation of. ·plaintiff's
professionai property."

Ap.p. 4-5.
.

Respondent answered and moved
.

for .surnmary judgment, which was summarily· granted by the trial
court.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed.

The majo-rity held

that petitioner's complaint stated a cause ·of action for conversion
and for fnfringement of a common law copyright, and one judge con. curred in the judgment on the ground that the c'o mplaint stated a
cause of action for appropriation of .petitioner's "right o:f
publicity" in the film of his act.

All three judges agreed that

the First Amendment did not privilege the press to show the entire
p.erforrn:ance ·on a news program without compensating petitioner for
any financial injury he could prove at trial •
. Like the concurring judge in ttle Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court of Ohio rested petitioner's cause of action under
state law on his •iright to the publicity value of his performance."
47 Ohio St. 2d 224, _

N.E. 2d _

(1976)•

The opinion Syllabus~

Zacchini
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to which we are to look for the rule ·of law used to decide . the
2/
case,
declared first that one may not use for his own benefit
the name or .likeness of another, whether or
fit is a

cornrnerc~al

~bt

the use or bene-

one, and ·second that respondent would be liable

for the appropriation, over petitioner's objection and without
license or privilege, of petitioner's right to the publicity value
of his

performance~

Ibid.

fo~ ~espondent b~cause,

The court nevertheless gave judgment

in the words of the Syllabqs:

·~ TV station has a privilege to report
in its news ca sts matters of legitimate
public ~nterest which would otherwise be
protected by an individual's right of
publicity, unless the actual int~nt of
the TV station· was to appropriate the
benefit of the publicity for some nonprivileged private use, or unless the actual intent was to injure the individual."
Ibid.

We granted certiorari, __ U.S._ (1977), to consider
an issue unresolved by this Court:

whether the First and

Fourteenth Amendments immunized respondent .from damages for its .
alleged infringement of petitioner's state law ''right of publicity."
Petition for Cert{orari 2.

Insofar as the Ohio Supreme Court held

that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution required judgment for respondent, we reverse the
judgment of that court.

Zacchini
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If · the judgment below rested on an independent and
adequate · state ground, the writ of cert:i,..orari should be
dismissed as improvidently granted, Wilson v. Lowes, 355 U.S.

597 (1958), . for "our only power over state judgments is to
correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal
laws . . And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions.

We are not permitted · to render an advisory

opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state
court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review
could amount to . nothing more than an advisory opinion."
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-126 (1945).

Herb v.

We ' are confident, how-

ever, that the judgment below did not rest on an adequate and
independent · state ground and that we have jurisdiction to decide
the federal issue presentedin this case.
There is no doubt that petitioner's complaint was grounded
in

stat~

law and that the right of publicity whi6h petitioner was

held to possess was a right under Ohio law . . It is also clear
that respondent's claim of constitutional privilege was sustained.
The source of this privilege was not identified in the Syllabus.
It . is clear enough from the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court,
· which we are permitted to consult ·for understanding qf the Syllabus, ·
Perkins

v.

.

Ben~uet

3/ .
Mining Co ..·, 342 U.S. 437, 442-443 (1952),-

that in · adjudicating the crucial question of whether respondent had

Zacchini
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a privilege to film and televise respondent's performance, the
court. turne.d immediately to Time, Inc. v. HiLL, 385 U.S. 374
· (196 7) .

It cons tru•ed the principle of that case, along with

that of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 354 (1964), to be
that "the press has a pr.ivilege to report matters of legitimate
public

intere~t

even though such reports might iritrude on matters

otherwise pr·i vate," and concluded, therefore, that the press is
also . "privileged when an individual seeks to publicly exploit his
talents while keeping the benefits private."
N.E~

234, _

2d, at _ .

47 Ohio St. 2d, at

The privilege thus exists in cases

"where the appropriation of the right of publicity is claimed."
.

.

The court's opinion also referred to Draft 21 of the relevant
portion of Restatement of Torts Second, which was understood to
· make room for reasonable press appropriations by limiting the
reach of the right of privacy rather than by .creating a privileged
invasion.

The opinion said, however, that "the gravamen of the

issue in this case is not whether the degree of ·intrusion is
.

.

reasonable but whether First ·Amendment principles require that the
right of privacy

give ~·

way to the public right to be informed of

matters · of public interest and concern.

The concept of privilege

seems the more useful and appropriate one."
N.E. 2d, at ___· .

Id., at 234 n. 5,

(Emphasis added.)

The controlling consideration was thus one of privilege
rather than of the substantive reach of the right of publicity • .
In deciding the question, had the Ohio court rested on both state

Zacchini
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and federal grounds, either of which would .have been dispositive,
we wo.u ld have ·no juris dicti.on.

Fox Films v. Mueller, 296

. U.S. ·207 (1935); Enterprise Irrigation District v. · Farmers Mutual
.Canal Company, 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917) • . · But the opinion, like
the Syllabus, did not mention the Ohio constitution, citing
instead this .Court's First Amendment cases as
appea~s

controlli~3.

lt

to us that decision rested solely on federal grounds.

That the Ohio · court might have, but did not, invoke· state law does
not foreclose jurisdiction here. - Steel v. l.&N R. Co., 323 U.S.
192, 197 n. 1 (1944); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S.
95, 98 (1938).

If the judgment in favor of respondent

must - nev~rtheless

be understood as ultimately res.ting on Ohio law, it appears that
at the very least the Ohio court felt compelled by what it understood
to be federa;l constitutional considerations to construe and apply
its own law in the manner it did.

In this event, we have jurisdic-

tion and should. decide the federal issue; for if the state court
erred in its understanding of our· cases and of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, we should so declare, leaving the state
court free to decide the privilege issue solely as a matter of Ohio
law.

Perkins v. Benquet Mining Co., supra.

"If the Supreme Court

[of Ohio] held as it did because it felt under compulsion of
federal law as enunciated by this Court so to hold, it should be
relieved of -that compulsion.

It should be freed to decide these

suits according to .its own local law."

u . s ~ 1 ' 5 ( 19 50 ) .

Missouri v. Mayfield, 340
.,. .

.Zacchini
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The .Ohio Supreme Court held that respondent is
constitutionally privileged to include in . its newscasts matters
of public interest that would otherwise be protected by the
ri"ght of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate
for some nonprivileged purpose.

If under this standard

re~pon-

·dent had merely reported that petitioner was performing at the
fair ·and described or commented on his act, with or without showing
his picture on television, we would have a very different case.
But petitioner is not contending that his appearance at the fair
and his performance could· not be reported by the press as news- ·
worthy items.

His complaint is that respondent filmed his

~ntire

act and displayed
that film on television "fo"r the public to see
.
~

and enjoy.

This, he claimed, _was an appropriation of his pro-

fessional property.

The Ohio Supreme Court agreed that petitioner

had "a right of publicity" that gave. him "personal .cont1:ol over
the commercial display and exploitation of his personality and . the

.

4/

exercise qf his talents." --

.

This right of "exclusive control

over the publicity given to his performance" was said to be such

.· a "valuable

part of the . benefit which may be attained by his

talents and effo1:ts" that it was entitled to legal protection.

It

was also observed, or at least expressly assumed, that petitioner
had not abandoned his rights by performing under the circumstances
present at the Geauga County Fair Grounds.

..

.
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The Ohio Supreme Court nevertheless held that the
challenged invasion was privileged, saying that the pr~ss "must
'
be accorded broad · latitude
in its choice of how much it presents
of each story or incident, -and of the emphasis to
such presentation.

b~

given to

No fixed standard which would bar the press

.

.

from reporting or depicting either an entire occurrence or an
entire discrete part of a public

er formance
..-- can be formula ted

--------

which would not unduly restrict the 'breathing room' in reporting
which freedom of the press requires."

47 Ohio St., at 235,
.

--

N.E. 2d, at _· _._ . . Under this view, respondent was thus constitutio~ally

5/

free to film and display petitioner's entire act. -

The Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on Time, Inc. v.
Hill, supra, but that case does not mandate a media privilege to
televise a performer's entire act without his consent.
in

~'

Involved

.!l!.£· v. Hill was a claim under the New York "Right of

Privacy" statute that Life Magazine, in the co\;l.rse of reviewing a
newplay, had connected the play witha

long~past

incident involving

petitioner and his family and had ·falsely described their experience and conduct at that time. · The complaint sought damages for
humiliation and suffering flowing from these nondefamatory falsehoods that allegedly invaded Hill's privacy.

The Court held,

however, that the opening of a new play linked to an actual incident
was a matter of public interest and that Hill could not recover
without $hewing that the Life report was knowingly false or was

•

Zacchini
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· published with reckless disregard for the truth-- the
rigorcn~s

sa~e

standard th.at had been applied in New York Times v.

Sullivan, supra.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, which was hotly contested and decided
by a divided Cburt, involved an entirely di...fferent tort than the
"right of publicity" recognized by . the Ohio Supreme Court.

As

the opinion reveals in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court was steeped
in the liter.ature of privacy law and was aware of the developing
distinctions and nuances in this branch of the .law.

The Court,

for example) cited Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (3d Ed.
1964), and the same author's well-known arti<_:!le, Privacy, 48 Cal.
L. Rev. 383 (1960), both of which divided privacy into four distinct branches.

l/

The Court was aware that it was adjudicating

a "faise light" privacy case involving a matte~ of public interest,
not a case involving "intrusion·," _385 U.S., at 384-385 n. 9, "appropr.iation" of a name ·ox: likeness for the purposes of trade, id.,
at 381, or "private details" about a non-news:wo.rthy person or event,
id., ·a t 383 n. 7.

It is also abundantly clear that Time, Inc. v.

Hill did not involve a performer, a person with a name having
commercial value, or any claim to a "right of . publicity."

This ·

discrete kind of "appropriation" case was plainly identified in the

.

.

.

8/

literature cited by the Court -

9/

reported cases. -

and had been adjudicated in the

Zacchini
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The differences between these two .torts are important.
Fit:st, the State's l.nterests in providing a cause of action in
each instance are different.

"The interest protected" in per-

mittin.g recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light "is
·

~

clearly that of reputat.ion, with the same overtones of mental
distress as in defamation."
400.

P.r osser, supra, 48 Cal. L. Rev., at

By contrast, the State's in·t erest in permitting . a "right of

publicity" is in protecting the proprietary interest of the in--- . --10/
dividual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment. --

------

As. we later note, the State's interest is closely analogous to the
goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the . right of the
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors and ..having_little
t:o do with .protecting feelings or reputation.

Second, the two

torts differ in the degree to which they intrude on dissemination
of information to the

p~blic.

In "false light" cases the only

to protect the interests involved is to attempt to minimize
publication of the damaging matter, while in "right of publicity"
cases the only question is who gets to do the publishing.
entertainer such as

~etitioner

An

usually has no objection to the

widespread publication of his act as long as he gets · the commercial
benefit of such publication.

Indeed, in the present case peti-

tioner did not seek to enjoin the broadcast· of his act; he simply
sought compensation for the broadcast in the form of damages.

Zacchini
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Nor does it appear that our later cases, such as
Rosenbtoom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); and Time, Inc .. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1_976) , require or furnish substant"ial support for

the ·Ohio court's privilege ruling.. These cases, like New York
Times, emphasize the protection extended to the press by the
First Amendment in defamation cases, particularly when suit is
brought by a public official or a public figure . . None of them
involve an alleged appropriation by the press of a right of
publicity existing under state law.
Moreover, Time, Inc. v. Hill, New York Times, Metromedia,
Gertz, and Firestone all involved the reporting of events; in

--

-

none of them was there an attempt to broadcast or publish an
E

.

ire act) for which the performer _Qr_9 inarily · gets paid.

It is

evident, and there is no claim here to the contrary, that petitioner's -state-law right of publicity would not serve to prevent
resp;ndent from reporting ~worthy fa ctJ about petitioner's
11/
~ -------~
~
act. Whereve.r the line in particular situations is to be
d,rawn betweenmedia reports that are protected and those that are
not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire

-

act without his consent.

The Constitution no more prevents a

State from r .e quiring respondent to compensate petitioner for
broadcasting his act on television than it would privilege
respondent to film and broadcast a co·p yrighted dramatic work
without liability to the copyright owner, 17 U.S.C.,

. - 12 -

Za.cchini

cf. Kalem · Co. v. Harper Bros. ; 222 U.S. 55 (1911) ; Manners v.•
Moresco, 252 U.S. 317 (1920), or to film and broadcast a prize
fight, Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting

Corp.~

229 F.2d

481 (CA 3 1956), or a baseball game, Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v.
KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938), where the
promoters or the participants had other plans for publicizing the
event~

There are ample reasons for reaching this conclusion.
cast of a film of

etitioner's entire act poses

a substantial threat to the economic value of the

-

ac ~

As the

Ohio court recognized, this act is the product of _petitioner's own
talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort and ex- ·
pense.

Much of . its economic value lies in the "right of exclusive

control over the publicity given to his performance"; if the
public can see the act for . free on television they will be less
12/
willing to pay to see it at the fair. The effect of a public
broadcast of the performance is similar to preventing petitioner
from charging an admission fee. · "The rationale for [protecting

~~ he right of publicit~]is the straightforward one of preventing

\ C1

~cf""·

--

unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is
served by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and
normally pay."
Brand~is

f~r

which he would

Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and .

Wrong?, 31 Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 331 (1966).

__

Moreover, the broadcast

_.._ etitioner's

entire performance, unlike

the unauthorized USe Of another IS name. for the purpOSeS Of trade

Zacthini
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or the irtcidental use of . · a name or picture by the press,

oes

to the h_gsitt of p..etitioner 's ability to . ea~n a living as a_n
.
'
entertainer. . Thus in this case, Ohio has recognized what may be
the strongest case for a "right of publicity" -- involving riot
the appropriation of an entertainer's reputation to enhance the
attractiveness of acommercial product, but the appropriation of
the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation
in the first place.
Of course, Ohio's decision to protect petitioner's right
of publicity here rests on more than a des·ire to compensate the
performer for the . time .and effort invested in his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the
investment
public.

requir~d

to produce a performance of interest to the

This same consideration underlies

laws long enforced by this Cou.r t.
Stein, 347

u.s.

201~

~he .

patent and copyright

As the Co1,1rt stated in Mazer v.

219 (1964),

"The economic ·philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant .
patents and copyrights · is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted
to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services
rendered."
These laws perhaps .regard the "reward to the owner a secondary
· consideration," United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131,
158 (194.8), but they were "intended definitely to grant valuable,

Zac.chini
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enforceable rights" in order to afford greater encouragement
to the production of works of benetit to the . public.
Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 . u.s. 30, 36 (1939).
tion does not prevent Ohio from making

a

Washingtonian
The Constitu-

similar choice here in

deciding to protect . the entertainer's incentive in order to
enc6urage the production of this type of work for public benefit.
Cf.' Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Kewanee Oil Co.
13/
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 476 (1974).
There is no doubt that · entertainment, as well as news,
enjoys First Amendment protection.

It is also .true that entertain-

ment itself· can be important .news.

Time, Inc. y. Hill, supra.

But

it is important to note · that neither the public rior respondent will
be deprived of the benefit of petitioner's performance as ·long as
his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized.
Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance;
he simply wants to be paid for it.

Nor do we think that a state-law

damages remedy against respondent would represent a species of
li~bility

without fault contrary to the letter or spirit of Gertz,

Respondent knew exactly that petitioner objected to telehis act, but nevertheless displayed the entire film.

.

14/

We conclude, as have others,-

~

that although the State of

Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the
circumstances of this case, the. First and Fourteenth Amendments do
· not require it to do so.
Reversed.

Zacchini footnotes
1_/

The script of the commentary accompanying the film

clip read as follows:
"This •
tor . sport .

·now

is the story of a true spectathe sport of human cannonballing . •

in fact, the great Zacchini is . about the only human
· Cannonball around, these days . . . just happens that,
where he is, is the Great Geauga County Fair, in
Burton .

and believe me, although it'$ not a long

act, it's a thriller • . . and you really ·need to see
'it ·in person . . . to appreciate

•

~t

.. . . . .II

{Emphasis

· in original.) · App. 12.

!:_/

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 93 n. 2 (1964); Perkins

v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, . 441-443 (1952); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 554 (1940).

See

Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17 (1967); The Williamson
Heater Co. v. Radich, 128 Ohio St. 124 (1934); Thackery v.
Helfrich, 123 Ohio St. 334, 336 (1931); State v. Hauser, 101
Ohio St. 404, 408 (1920); 14 Ohio Jur. 2d I 247.
}/

!n Perkins the issue was whether the Ohio courts

could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.

The Syllabus of the Ohio Supreme Court declared that

it did not have personal jurisdiction, but it gave no indication of whether the Ohio court's decision rested on state
grounds or on the Fourteenth Amendment.

The only opinion
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filed with the Syllabus reasoned, however, that the Due
Process Clause of .the Fourteenth Amendment p.rohibited the
Ohio courts from exercising personal jurisdiction in that
case.

While recognizing the existence of the Ohio Syllabus

. rule, _this Court felt obliged in these circumstances to reach
the merits of the constitutional issue, holding that the Due
Process Clause did not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction.
"[F]or us to allow the judgment to stand as it is would risk
an affirmance of a decision which might have been decided
differently if the court below had felt free, under our
decisions, to do so."
4/

342 U.S., at 443.

The court relied on Housh

v.

Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35,

133 N.E. 2d 340 (1956), the Syllabus of which held:
"An actionable invasion of the right of
privacy is the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality, the publicizing of one's
private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's
private activities in such a manner as to outrage
or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to
a person or ordinary sensibilities." ·
The court also indicated that the applicable principles of
Ohio law were those set out in Restatement of Torts Second,
Tentative Draft . No. 13, 1967, . § 252c, and the comments

Zacchini footnotes

-3-

thereto, portions of which · were .stated in the footnotes of
the opinion.

Also, referring to the right as the "right of
'
publicity," the court
quoted approvingly from Haelan Laboratories, Inc . . v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., · 202 F. 2d 866, 868
(C .A. 2 (1952).

2/

The court's expfication was as follows:

"The proper standard must necessarily be whether
the matters reported were of
..... public interest, and
~

if so, the press will be liable for appropriation
of a performer's right of publicity only if its
actual intent was not to report the performance,
but, rather, to appropriate the performance for
some other private use, or if the actual intent
was to injure the performer.

It might also be the

case that the press would be liable if it recklessly disregarded contract rights existing between
the p laintiff and a third person to present the
p: rformance to the public, but that question is
not presented here."

47 Ohio St., at 235, _._

N.E.2d,

at .
6/

Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law pro-

vides an action for injunction and damages for invasion of
the "right .of privacy" granted by§ 50':
"A pe rson, firm or corporation that uses
for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of

Zacchini footnotes
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trade, the name, portrait or picture of any
living person without having first obtained
the written consent of such person, or if a
minor of hi$ or her parent or guardian, is
guilty of a misdemeanor."

·ll

"The law of privacy · comprises f<:>ur distinct kinds

--

of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff,
which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise
have almost nothing in common except that each represents an
interference with the right of the plaintiff."
Priv~cy,

48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960).

Prosser,

Thus, according to

Prosser, some courts had recognized a cause of action for
"intrusion" upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude;
public disclosure of "private facts" about the plaintiff's
personal life; publicity that places the plaintiff in a
"false light" in the public eye; and "appropriation" of the
plaintiff's name or likeness for commercial purposes.

One

may be liable for "appropriation" if he "pirate[s] the
plaintiff's identity for some advantage of his own."

48 Cal.

L. Rev., at 403.

§_/

See, for example, Prosser, Torts, 3rd Ed. 842

(1964); Blaustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity;
An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 962, 986-991
(1964); Kalven,. Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 3.1 Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 331 (1966).
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Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting

Corp., 229 F. 2d 481 (C.A. 3 1956); Sharkey v. National
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 93
Pittsburgh

Athl~tic

F~

Supp. 986 (S.D. N.Y. 1950);

Co. v. KQV Broa<icasting Co., 24 F. Supp.

490 (1938); Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio Press Service, Inc.', 165 Misc. 71, 30 N.Y.S. 159
(1937); Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.t.Q. 314 (Pa.
Ct. C.P. 1957);

~yers

v. U. S. Camera Publishing Corp., 167

. N.Y.S. 2d 771, City Ct. of City of N.Y. (1957).

The cases

prior to 1961 are helpfully reviewed in Gordon, Right of
Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
N.W.U.L. Rev. 553 (1960).
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., supra,
involved a challenge to television exhibition of a film made
of a prize fight that had occurred some time ago.

Judge

Biggs, writing for the Court of Appeals, said at 229 F. 2d
486, 490:
"There are, speaking very generally, two
polar types of cases.

One arises when some

accidental occurrence rends the veil of obscurity surrounding an average person and makes him,
arguable, newsworthy.

The other type involves

the appropriation of the performance or production of a professional performer or entrepreneur.
Between the two extremes are many gradations,

.:
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most involving strictly commercial exploitation
of some aspect of an individual's personality,
such as his name or picture.

"The fact is that, if a performer performs for
hire, a curtailment, without consideration, of
his right to control his performance is a wrong
to him.

Such a wrong vitally affects his liveli-

hood, precisely as a , trade libel, for example,
affects the earnings of a corporation.

If the

artistry of the performance he used as a criterion, _every judge perforce must turn himself
into a literary, theatrical or sports critic."
· 10/

The Ohio Supreme Court expressed the view "that

plaintiff's claim is one for invasion of the right of privacy
by appropriation, and should be considered as such."
St., at 226, ___N.E. 2d, at ___ .

47 Ohio

It should be noted, however,

that the case before us is more limited than the broad
category of lawsuits that may arise under the heading of
"appropriation."

Petitioner does not merely assert that

some g.e neral use, such as advertising, was made of his name
or likeness; he relies on the much narrower claim that
respondent televised an entire act that he ordinarily gets
~

paid to perform.

.;
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Prosser, Torts, 4th Ed. (1971), 806-807, generalcases~

"The New York courts were faced very early with the
obvious fact that newspapers and magazines, to say
noshing of radio, television and motion pictures, .
are by no means philanthropic institutions, but are
operated for profit.

As against the contention that

every.t hing published by these agencies must
sarily be 'for purposes of trade,' they were

neces~

.

~ompelled

to hold that there must be some closer and more direct
connection, beyond the mere fact that the newspaper
itself is sold; and that the presence of advertising
matter in adjacent columns, or even the duplication
of a news item for the purpose of advertising the
publication itself, does not make any difference.
Any other conclusion would in all probability have
been an unconstitutional interference with the
freedom of the press.

Atcordingly, it has been held

that the mere incidental mention of the plaintiff's .
name in a book or a motion picture is not an invasion
of his privacy; nor is the publication of a photograph or a newsreel in which he incidentally appears."
(Footnotes omitted.)
Compare American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second,
Tentative Draft No. 22, § 652c, Comment

D~

' .

Zacchini footnotes
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It is possible, of course, that respondent's news

broadcast increased the value of petitioner's pe.rformance by
stimulating . the public's interest in seeing the act live.

In

.

.

these circumstances, petitioner would not be able to prove
damages and thus would not recover.

But petitioner has alleged

that the broadcast injured him to the extent of $25,000,
App. 5, and we think the State should be allowed to compensate
this injury if proven.
13/

Goldstein involved a California statute outlawing

"record piracy"--the unauthorized duplication of recordings
of performances by major musical artists.

Petitioners there

launched a multifaceted constitutional attack on the statute,
but they did not argue that the statute violated the First
Amendment.

In rejecting this broad-based constitutional

attack, this Court concluded:
"The California statutory. scheme evidences a legislative policy to prohibit 'tape piracy'' and "record
piracy':, conduct that may adversely affect the continued production of new recordings, a large industry in California.

Accordingly, the State has, by

statute, given to recordings the attributes of
property~

No restra int has been placed on the use

of an idea

o~

concept; rather, petitioners and other

individuals in precisely the same manner and with

Zacchini footnotes

-9-

the same persohnel as appeared on

th~

original

recording.
•.

"Until and .. unless Congress takes further action
with respect to recordings . . . , the California
statute may be enforced against acts of piracy
such as those which occurred in the present case."
412 U.S., at 571.

(Emphasis added.)

We note that federal district courts have rejected First
Amendment challenges to the federal copyright law . on the
ground that "no restraint has been placed on the use of an
idea or concep·t."

United' States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp.

1265, 1267 (S.D. Okla. 1974).

See also Walt Disney Produc-

tions v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 115 (N.D. Cal.
1972) (citing Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press, 17 U.S.L.A.L. Rev. 1180
(1970), arguing that . copyright law does not abridge the First
Amendment because it does not restrain the communication of
ideas or concepts); Robert Stigwood GrouB Ltd v. O'Reilly,
346 F. Supp. 376 . (D. Conn. 1972) (also relying on Ninnner).
Of course this case does not make a claim that respondents
would be prevented by petitioner's "right of publicity" from
staging or filming its own "human cannonball" act.

-10-

Zacchini footnotes

In Kewanee this Court upheld the constitutionality of
Ohio's trade . secret law, although again no First Amendment
claim was presented.

Ci~ing

Goldstein, the Court stated:

"Just as the States may exercise regulatory
power over writings so may the States regulate
with respect to discoveries.

States may hold

diverse viewpoints in pr6tecting intellectual
property relating to invention as they do in
protecting the intellectual property relating
to the subject matter of copyright.

The only

limitation on the States is that in regulating
the area of patents and copyrights they do not
conflict with the operation of the laws in this
area passed by Congress . .

"

416 U.S., at 479.

Although recognizing that the trade secret law resulted in
preventing the public gaining certain information, the Court
emphasized that the law had "a decidedly beneficial effect
on society," id., at 485, and that without it, "organized
scientific and technological research could become fragmented, and society, as a whole, would suffer~"

Id., -at

487.
14/

"There can be no offense to the Constitution if

the [media] is compelled to pay the fair value of what it has
taken . .

"

Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First

Zacchini footnotes
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Amendment, 76 Col. L. Rev. 1205, 1276 (1976) . . "More and more
courts seem willing to acknowledge that plaintiffs who sue
for . appropriation deserve damages not because they suffered
some kind of severe mental distress but because the defendant
used something which belonged to the plaintiff--his name or
likeness--without compensation.'' . Pember and Teeter, Privacy
in the Press Since Time v. Hill, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 57, 87

(1974).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~!·
No. 76-577
Hugo Zacchini, Petitioner, )

v.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
~cripps-Howard Broadcasting
Supreme Court of Ohio.
Company.
[June -, 1977]

MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Hugo Zacchini, is an entertainer. He performs
a "human cannonball" act in which he is shot from a cannon
into a net some 200 feet away. Each performance occupies
; ome 1.5 seconds. In August and September, 1972, petitioner
was engaged to perform his act on a regular basis at the
( {pauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. He performed in a
ft• nced area, surrounded by grandstands, at the fair grounds.
Members of the public attending the fair were not charged a
separate admission fee to observe his act.
On August 30, a freelance reporter for Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Company, the operator of a television broadcasting station and respondent in this case, attended the fair.
He carried a small movie camera. Petitioner noticed the
reporter and asked him not to film the performance. The
rP porter did not do so on that day; but on the instructions of
the producer of respondent's daily newscast, he returned the
following clay and videotaped the entire act. This film clip,
approximately 15 seconds in length, was shown on the 11
o 'cloek news program that night, together with favorable
c·ommell tary .'
1

T IH·

~<cript

of the commentary accompanying the film clip read as

l(llto w ~ ·

··Thi" •

• now . •. i::; the &
ior of a tnre spectator sport • .. the sport

~ - ?-77
..-.
~

~

ZACCHINI

v~ SC~IPfS-gOWAllp

BROAPQASTINp CO:

Petitioner then brou~ht this !i-Ction f9r dama~es, alleg.in~
that he is "engaged in the entertainment business," that the
:tct he performs is one "invented by his father and ... performed only by his family for the last 50 years," tha.t
respondent "showed and commercialized the film of his act
without his consent," and that such conduct was an "unlawful
appropriation of plaintiff's professional property.'' App. 4-5.
Respondent answered and moved for summary judgment,
which was summarily granted by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. The majority held
that petitioner's complaint stated a cause of action for conversion and for infringement of a common law copyright, and
one judge concurred in the judgment on the ground that the
complaint stated a cause of action for appropriation of petitioner's "right of publicity" in the film of his act. All three
judges agreed that the First Amendment did not privilege the
press to show the entire performance on a news program
without compensating petitioner for any financial injury he
·could prove at trial.
Like the concurring judge in the Court of Appeals, the
•'upreme Court of Ohio rested petitioner's cause of action
under state law on his "right to the publicity value of his
performance." 47 Ohio St. 2d 224,- N. E. 2d- (1976).
~rhe opinion Syllabus, to which we are to look for the rule of
law used to decide the case/ declared first that one may not
of human cannonballing . . . in fact, the great Zacchini is about the only
human cannonball around, the::;e days .. . just happens that., where he is,,
'" t hr Gn·a t 0Pauga County Fair, in Burt.on . .. and believe me, although
1t 'o not. a long act, it's a thriller ... and you really need to see it in.
pPn;on ... to a.ppreciate it. ..." (Emphasis in original.) App. 12.
~ B e ck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 93 n. 2 (1964); Perkirus v. Benguet Mining
r'o.. 342 U. S. 437 441-443 , (1952); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 300
l". S. 551, 554 (1940) . Srr Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17 (1967);
Th P Williamson Heater Co . v. Radich, 128 Ohio St. 124 (1934); Thackery
1
Helfrich. 123 Ohio St. 334, 336 '(1931); State v. Hauser, 101 Ohio St ...
~:n.t , 40R. (192.0) ; 14 Ohio Jn.r.:. 2d §,247..
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use for his own benefit the name or likeness of another,
whether or not the use or benefit is f1 commercial one, and
second that respondent would be liable for the appropriation,
over petitioner's objection and without license or privilege, of
petitioner's right to the publicity value of his performance.
!bid. The court nevertheless gave judgment for respondf!nt
because, in the words of the Syllabus,
" la] TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts
matters of legitimate public interest which would otherwise be protected by an individual's right of publicity,
unlPss the actual intent of the TV station was to appropriate the benefit of the publicity for some nonprivileged
private use, or unless the actual intent was to injure tpe
individual." Ibid.
We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1977) , to consider an
issue unresolved by this Court: whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments immunized respondent from damages for
its alleged infringement of petitioner's state law ri~ht of
p ublicity." Petition for Certiorari 2. Insof&r as the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution required juQgment
for respondent, we reverse the judgment of that court.
11

II
If the judgment below rested on an independent and adequate state ground, the writ of certiorari should be disinissed
as improvidently granted. Wilson v. Lowes, 355 U. S. 597
( 1958). for "our only power over state judgments is to correct
them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal laws.
A.lld our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise
opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinwn, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state
court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion."
HP-r/] v. Pitcairn, 324. U. S. 117, 125- 126 0945) . We are

76-577-0PINION
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COllfident, however, that the Judgment below did not rest OI\
an adequate and independent state ground and that we have
jurisdiction to decide the federal issue presented in this case.
There is no doubt that petitioner's complaint was grounded
in state law and that the right of publicity which petitioner
was held to possess was a right under Ohio law. It is also
clear that respondent's claim of constitutional privilege was
sustained. The source of this privilege was not identified in
the Syllabus. It is clear enough from the opinion of the Ohio
Supreme Court, which we are permitted to consult for understanding of the Syllabus, Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342
U. S. 437, 442-443 (1952), 3 that in adjudicatit1g the crubial
question of whether respondent had a privilege to film and
televise respondent's performance, the court turned immediately to Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967). It cona In Perkins the is;;ue was whether the Ohio courts could exercise per;:oual jurisdiction ovf.'r a foreign corporation. The Syllabus of the Ohio
Supreme Court derlared that it did not. have per;;onal jurisdiction, but. it
gave no indication of whether the Ohio court'~ decision rested on state
grounds or on the Fourteenth Amendment. The only opinion filed with
the Syllabus reasoned, however, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. prohibited the Ohio courtl'i from exercising personal
JUrisdiction in that ca.s<'. While recognilling the existence of the Ohio
;:)~·llnbus rule, thi;: Court fPlt obliged in the;,e circumstances to reach the
merit:; of the con;,tit.utiom1l i~;,;ue, holding that the Due Process Clause
llid uot. preclude the exerci;,e of jurisdiction. "[F]or us to allow the
JUdgment to :;tancl a;; it is would risk an affirmance of a decision which
might have been decided differently if the court below had felt free, under
our decisions, t.o do so." 342 U.S., at 443.
The Ohio court~ do not. suggest tha.t the opinion is not relevant to a
determination of the Ohio Supreme Court's holding.
"The ;,yllabuti is the language of the court. The opinion is more
particularly t.he language of the judge preparing the same, and yet so
much of the opinion as is reasonably necessary to sustain the judgment
must of necessity be concurred in by the court·."
llart v . Andrews, 1o:3 Ohio St. 218, 221 (1921) (emphasis added). S~
:dso Willia~on Heater, supra; State v. Ha·user, supra.
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strued the principle of that case, along with that of New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 374 (1964), to be that "the press
has a privilege to report matters of legitimate publ\c interest
even though such reports might intrude on matters otherwise
private," and concluded, therefore, that the press is also
11
privileged when an individual seeks to publicly exploit his
talents while keeping the benefits private." 47 Ohio St. 2d,
at 234, N. E. 2d. at - . The privilege thus exists in
cases "where the appropriation of the right of publicity is
claimed." The court's opinion a.Iso referred to Draft 21 of
the relevant portion of Restatement of Torts Second, which
was understood to make room for reasonable press ~ppropria
tions by limiting the reach of the right of privacy r~ther than
by creating a privileged invasion. The opinion said, however,
that "the gravamen of the issue in this case is not whether the
degree of intrusion is reasonable but whether First Amendment prine--iples require that the right of privacy gives way to
the public right to be informed of matters of public interest
and concern. The concept of privilege seems the more useful
and appropriate one." ld., at 234 n. 5.,- N. E. 2d, at-.
(Emphasis added.)
The controlling consideration was thus one of privilege
rather tha.n of the substantive reach of the right of publicity.
In deciding the question, had the Ohio court rested on both
state and federal grounds, either of which would have been
dispositive. we would have had no jurisdiction. Fox Films v.
Mueller, 296 U. S. 207 (1935); Enterprise Irrigation District
v. Farmers Mutual Canal Company, 243 U.S. 157 164 (1917).
But the opinion. like the Syllabus, did not mention the Ohio
Constitution, citing instead this Court's First Amendment
eases as controlling. It appears to us that decision was rested
solely on federal grounds. That the Ohio court might havey
but rlid not. invoke state law does not foreclose jurisdiction
here. Steel v. L&f..: R . Co., 323 U. S. 192, 197 n. 1 (1944);
lndiGna ex rel. Ander::wn v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 98 (1938).

76-577-0PINION
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If the judgment in favor of respondent must nevertheless be
u nderstood as ultimately resting on Ohio law, it appears that
at the very least the Ohio court felt compelled by what it
understood to be federal constitutional considerations to construe and apply its own law in the manner it did. In this
event, we have jurisdiction and should decide the federal
issue; for if the state court erred in its understanding of our
·cases and of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, we should
so declare, leaving the state court free to decide the privilege
issue solely as a matter of Ohio law. Perkins v. Benguet
Mining Co., supra. "If the Supreme Court [of Ohio] held as
it did because it felt under compulsion of federal law as
enunciated · by this Court so to hold, it should be relieved of
that compulsion. It should be freed ·to decide these suits
according to its own local law." Missouri v. Mayfield, 340
u s. 1, 5 (1950) .

III
The Ohio Supreme Court held tha.t respondent is constitutio nally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public
interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of
publicity, absent an intent to irijure or to appropriate for
:5ome nonprivileged purpose. If under this standard respondent had merely reported that petitioner was performing at the
fair and described or commented on his act, with or without
howing his picture on television , we would have a very different case. But petitioner is not contending that his appeararlee at the fair and his performance could not be reported by
the press as newsworthy items. His complaint is that
respondent filmed his entire act and displayed that film on
television for the public to see and enjoy. This, he claimed,
was an appropriation of his professional property. The Ohio
Supreme Court agreed that petitioner had "a right of publicity" that gave him "personal control over the commercial
display and exploitation of his personality and the exercise of
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his talents." 4 This right of "exclusive control over the publicity given to his performance" was said to be such a "valuable part of the benefit which may be attained by his talents
and efforts" that it was entitled to legal protection. It was
also observed, or at least expressly assumed, that petitioner
had not abandoned his rights by performing under the circumstances present at the Geauga County Fair Grounds.
The Ohio Supreme Court nevertheless held that the challenged invasion was privileged, saying that the press "must be
accorded broad latitude in its choice of how much it presents
of each story or incident, and of the emphasis to be given to
such presentation. No fixed standard which would bar the
press from reporting or depicting either an entire occurrence
or an entire discrete part of a public performance to be
formulated which would not unduly restrict the 'breathing
room' in reporting which freedom of the press requires." 47
Ohio St., at 235, N. E. 2d, at - . Under this view,
respondent was thus constitutionaUy free to film and display
petitioner's entire act. 5
The court rrlied on Hou$h v. Peth, 165 Ohio St.. 35, 133 N. E. 2d 340
(1956), the Syllabu::; of which held:
'·An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is the unwarranted
a ppropria.tion or exploitation of one'::; per::;onality, the publicizing of one's
private affair::; with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the
wrongfu l intrusion into one's private activities in such a manner as to
outrage or cam;e mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person or
ordina ry sensibilitie~."
The court also indicnted that the applicable principles of Ohio law were
those set out in Restatement. of Torts Second, Tentative Dra.ft No. 13,
1967, § 252c, and the commrnt;:; thrreto, portions of which were stated in
thr footnote;:; of thr opinion. Also, referring to the right a;,; the " right of
publicity," the rourt quoted approvingly from Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, luc ., 202 F. 2d 866,868 (CA2) (1952).
r, Thr court.';,; explication wa.,; ns follows:
'Tho proper :-;tundard must ll(•ce;,;sarily be whether the matters reported
were of public intere:;t, and if so, the preti8 will be liable for appropriation
\If a rwrformcr'» right of publicit.y only if its actual intent was not w
1
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The Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on Time, Inc. v.
Hill, supra, but that· case does not mandate a media privilege
to televise a performer's entire act without his consent.
Involved in Time, Inc. v. Hill was a claim under the New
York "Right of Privacy" statutefi\that Life Magazine, in the
course of reviewing a new play, had connected the play with a
long-past incident involving petitioner and his family and had
falsely described their experience and conduct at that time.
The complaint sought damages for humiliation and suffering
flowing from these nondefamatory falsehoods that allegedly
invaded Hill's privacy. The Court held, however, that the
opening of a new play linked to an actual incident was a
matter of public interest and that Hill could not recover without showing that the Life report was knowingly false or was
published with reckless disregard for the truth-the same
rigorous standarcl that had been applied in New York Times
v. Sullivan, supra.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, which was hotly contested and decided
by a divided court, involved an entirely different tort than
the "right of publicity" recognized by the Ohio Supreme
Court. As the opinion reveals in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court
was steeped in the literature of privacy law and was aware of
the developing distinctions and nuances in this branch of the
law. The Court, for example, cited Prosser, Handbook ofthe
report the p<>rformance, but, rather, to appropriate the performance for
other private tt:-;e, or if the actual intent was to injure the performer ..
[t might, also be the cn~<> that the pre,.;s would be liable if it reckle&'Sly
dbTegarded contract rights existing between the plaintiff and a third
per~on to present the performance to th<> public, but that questjon is
not pr~£>ntro lwr£> ." 47 Ohio St., at 2:~5,- X E. 2d, a t - .
0 S£>ct.ion 51 of the New York Civil Hight,; Law provides an action for·
injtmeuon and damages for inva.:;ion of the "right of privacy" granted by
~omc

§50:
''A p<>rson, firm or corporation tha.t uses for advertising purposes, or for·
the purpo;;<>;; of trade, the name, portrait. or picture of any living person·
without luwing fir:;t obtoflined th£> written consent of such person, or if a.
w.i not Qf his 01;, hf'r earent. 0~ gunrd.ian, is ~t,tilty of a misdemeanor."

~
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Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) , and the same author's well-known
article, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1000) , both of which
divided privacy into four distinct branches. 7 The Court was
aware that it was adjudicating a "false light" privacy case
involving a matter of public interest, not a case ipvolving
"intrusion," 385 U. S., at 384-385, n. 9, "appropriation" of a
name or likeness for the purposes of trade, id., at 381, or
11
private details" apoutinon-newsworthy person or event, id.,
at 383 n. 7. It is also abundantly clear that TiTM, Inc. v.
Hill did not involve a performer, a person with a np.m e having
commercial value, or any claim to a "right of publicit'y." This
rliscretc kind of "appropriation" case WllS plamly identified in
the literature cited by the Court 8 and had been adjudicated
in th e reported cases.9
·' The law of privacy compri~es four distinct kinds of invasiop. of four
different intNeot ~ of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common
name, hu t ot.herwise have a.lmo~t nothing in common except that each
rep rr;;('nts an int erference wit.h the right of the plaintiff." Prosser,
Privacy, 48 Calif. L. R ev. 383, 389 (1960) . Thus, according to Prosser,
some court:; had recognized a cauoe of action for " intrusion" upon the
plnintiff':; ~eclu sion or solitude; public disclosure of "private facts" about.
llw plain t iff'~ per:sonal life ; publicity that places the plaintiff in a "false
li)l:ht " in the public eye; nnd "appropriation" of the plaintiff's name or
likene.-'s for comm('rcial purpo:ses. One may be liable for "appropriation"
J!' he '' pirat e [s] the pl a intiff '~ ideutity for some advantage of his own ."
..J.8 Cali f. L . R ev ., at. 403.
8 S('e, fo r exampl(', Prosser, Torts, 3rd Ed. 842 (1964); Bloustein,
Privacy a~> an Aspect of Human Dignity ; An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N. Y. U. L. R ev . 962, 986- 991 (1964) ; K alven, Privacy in Tort LawWere Wnrren and Brandei:; Wrong?, 31 Law and Contemporary Problems
:326, 33 1 (1966) .
" E. g .. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp ., 229 F. 2d 481
(CA3 1956 ) ; Sharke y v . National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 93 F . Supp. 986
(~D N Y 1950) ; PittsburrJh Athletic Co. v . KQV BroadcG.$ting Co., 24 F.
Supp. 490 (1938); Twentieth Centw·y Sporting Club, Inc. v. Tmnsradio
Press Se rvice, In c., 165 M i:::c. 71, 30 N . Y. S. 159 (1937); Hogan v. A. S.
Harnes ,~ Co., 114 U. S. P . L. Q, 314 (Pa . Ct. C. P . 1957); Myers v.
l.i .S. Camera P'!J,.blis.hing Co.rp ., 167 N. Y. S . 2d 771 , City Ct. of Cit.y of
7

...
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The differences between these two torts are important.
First, the State's interests in providing a cause of action in
each instance are different. "The interest protected" in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light "is
clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental
'distress as in defamation." Prosser, supra, 48 Calif. L. Rev.,
at 400. By contrast, the State's interest in permitting a "right
of publicity" is in protecting the proprietary interest of the
individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.10 As we later note, the State's interest is closely
N.Y. (1957). The cases prior to 1961 are helpfully reviewed in Gordon,
of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
N . W. U. L. Rev. 553 (1960).
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., supra, involved a challenge to television exhibition of a film made of a. prize fight that had
occurred some time ago. Judge Biggs, writ-ing for the Court. of Appea.Is,
said at 229 F. 2d 486, 490:
"There are, speaking very generally, two polar types of cases. One
arises when some accidental occurrence rends the veil of obscurity surrounding an average person and makes him, arguable, newsworthy. The
other type involves the appropriation of the performance or production
of a. professional performer or entrepreneur. Between the two extremes
are many gradations, most involving strictly commercial exploitation of
some aspect of an individual's personality, such as his name or picture.
I~ight

"The fact. is that, if a performer performs for hire, a curhdlment., without
consideration, of his right to control his performance is a wrong to him.
Such a. wrong vitally affects his livelihood, precisely as a trade libel, for
example, affects the earnings of a corporation. If the artistry of the
performance be used as a criterion, every judge perforce must turn
himself into a literary, theatrical or sports critic."
10 The Ohio Supreme Court expressed the view "that plaintiff's claim
i,.: one for invasion of the right of privacy by appropriation, a.nd should
be considered as such." 47 Ohio St., at. 226, N. E. 2d, at - . It
..;hould be noted, however, that the case before us is more limited than
the broad category of law~;uit::; that may arise undE'r the heading of
·'appropriatioi1.'' Petitioner does not merely assert that some general use.
l:fQ.ch a~; advertising, was made oi his name or likeness; he relies on the
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analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing
on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his
endeavors and having little to do with protecting feelings or
reputation. Second, the two torts differ in the degree to
which they intrude on dissemination of information to the
public. In "false light" cases the only way to protect the
interests involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the
damaging matter, while in "right of publicity" cases the only
question is who gets to do the publishing. An entertainer
such as petitioner usually has no objection to the widespread
publication of his act as long as he gets the commercial benefit
of such publication. Indeed, in the present case petitioner
did not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his act; he simply
sought compensation for the broadcast in the form of
damages.
Nor does it appear that our later cases, such as Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974); and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U. S. 448 (1976), require or furnish substantial support for
the Ohio court's privilege ruling. These cases, like New York
Times, emphasize the protection extended to the press by the
First Amendment in defamation cases, particularly when suit
is brought by a public official or a public figure. None of
them involve an alleged appropriation by the press of a right
of publicity existing under state law.
Moreover, Time, Inc. v. Hill, New York Times, Metromedia,
Gertz, and Firestone all involved the reporting of events; in
none of them was there an attempt to broadcast or publish
an entire act for which the performer ordinarily gets paid. It
is evident, and there is no claim here to the contrary, that
petitioner's state-law right of publicity would not serve to
prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts about
much nanower cla.im that . n•:-:pondenL televised an entire act tha.t he
orcuna.rily gets paid to pcrfonn.

76-577-0PINION
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petitioner's act. 11 Wherever the line in particular situations
is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and
those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent. · The
Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on
television than it would privilege respondent to film and
broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the
copyright owner, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et. seq., cf. Kalem Co. v.
Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911); Manners v. Morosoo, 252
U. S. 317 ( 1920), or to film and broadcast a prize fight, Ettore
v. Philco 'Pelev·ision Broadcasting Corp., 229 F. 2d 481 (CA3
KQV
1956) . or a baseball game. Pittsb'urgh Athletic Co.
Rroadcal5tiog Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (WD Pa. 1938), where the
promoters or the participants had other ·plans for publicizing
the event. There are ample reasons for reaching this
conclusion.
The broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a

v.

Pro~~er, Torts, -lt.h Ed. (1971), 806-807, generalizes on the cases:
''Th<> ~<>w York eourt~ were faced very earl~· with the obvious fact that
J\l'W!:iJl1tpt•r::; and magazirH',.;, to ~ay nothing of radio, television and motion
picture,.;, an' by no mt•an~ philant.hropir institution~;, but. are operated for
prollt . A,; agHin::;t. the cont<·ntion that everything published by these
agl'Hl'it•" tuu"t n rre::;.~aril~ · be 'for purpo~;r::; of trade,' they were compelled
to hold Uwt tl1en · mus1 be ::;ome clo::;er and morr direct connection, beyond
the nwre fact that the 1\t'W>'JlHJler ibelf i,; "old; and that t.he presence of
<tdvrrti~ing Ill a ttl:' I' in adjacent column::;, or r.ven the duplication of a news
item for t.Jw JHtrpo~P of Hdvertising the publication itself, does not make
auy ditfrn·uce . An~ · otlwr conclu::;ion would in all probability have been
an uneol\~titutional illl('rfc•retlCP wirh the frrc•dom of the press. According!~·, i 1 ha ..; brru hc,ld that t lw mere incident a I ment.ion of the plainWf's
Jwme in a book or a mut iou pic-ture i:< not a.n iuvasion of his priva-cy; nor
1" the publil'ation of :1 photo)!raph or a, new:;reel in which he incidentally
:tppt'ar,.:." (Foot notP,; omi1 i.ed .)
l'ompan· Auwric·a n La\\· lu~titut <:', He::> lalcmeJll of the Law Second, Tenta,.
[ 1\T Drafi ~o . 12, ~ tii>:!e, Comn ten(, D.
11
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substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.
As the Ohio court recognized, this act is the product of petitioner's own talents and energy, the end result of much time,
effort and expense. Much of its economic value lies in the
"right of exclusive control over the publicity given to his
performance"; if the public can see the act for free on television they will be Jess willing to pay to see it at the fair. 12 The
effect of a public broadcast of the performance is similar to
preventing petitioner from charging an admission fee. "The
rationale for [protecting the right of publicitW"s the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of
good will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have
market value and for which he would normally pay." Kalven,
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 331 (1966). Moreover, the broadcast of petitioner's entire performance, unlike
the unauthorized use of another's name for the purposes of
trade or the inpidental use of a name or picture by the press,
goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an
entertainer. Thus in this case, Ohio has recognized what may
be the strongest case for a "right of publicity"-involving not
the appropriation of au entertainer's reputation to ephance
the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his
reputation in the first place.
Of course, Ohio's decision to protect petitioner's right of
publicity here rests on more than a desire to compensate the
performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the
l 2 It is possible, of course, that respondent's news broadca;;t increased
the value of petitioner's performance by stimulating the public's interest
in seeing t.he act live . In thrt<e circumstances, petitioner would not be
able to prove damages and tllll:,; would not. recover. But petitioner has
alleged that the broadca~t mjurPd him to the extent of $25,000, App. 5,
'tnd wr think the State f<hould be allowed to compensate this injury if

{lfQV!:'ll.

J
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protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to
the public. This same consideration underlies the patent a.nd
copyright laws long enforced by this Court. As the Court
stated in Mazer v. Stein, 34-7 U.S. 201, 219 (1954),
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfa.re
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and· useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the
services rendered."
These laws perhaps regard the "reward to the owner as
secondary consideration," United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948), but they were "intended
definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights" in order to
afford greater encouragement to the production of works of
benefit to the public. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v.
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939). The Constitution does not
prevent Ohio from making a similar choice here in deciding to
[>rotect the entertainer's incentive in order to encourage the
production of this type of work for public benefit. Cf.
Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546 (1973); Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 476 (1974).ta
"' Goldstmt mvolved u. California. statute outlawing " record piracy"-t.he
llllHnthorized duplication of recording::; of 11erformances by major musical
a r, i::;t:,;. Pt•t it ion en; t hrrr launched a mult ifacet.ed constitutional attack
on the stat ute, but they did not argue that the statute violated the First
Amendment. In rejecting this broad-ba:;ed constitutional attack, this:
Court ronrluded :
·The Ca liforma statutor~· ~cheme evidences a legi:;lative policy to prohibit
tap<' piracy ' and 'record pmiCy,' conduct that may adversely affect. the
continuru production of nrw recording:;, a large industry in California.
Arr01:dipgly, thr Statr lw s, Qy :;tnt ute, gi.veu to recordings the at.tributes;

..
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There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news,
enjoys First Amendment protection. It is also true that
t'ntertainment itself can be important news. Time, Inc. v.
Hill, supra. But it is important to note that neither the
public nor respondent will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner's performance as long as his commercial stake in his
act is appropriately recognized. Petitioner does not seek to
<>njoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply wants to
be paid for it. Nor do we think that a state-law damages
remedy against respondent would represent a species of liability without fault contrary to the letter or spirit of Gertz,
supra. Respondent knew exactly that petitioner objected to
televising his act, but nevertheless displayed the en tire film.
We conclude, as have others,t• that although the State of
.> f property. No restraint has been p'la.ced on the use of an idea o1·
concept; rather, petitioners and other individuals in precisely the same
compensation." Pember and Teeter, Privacy in the Press Since Time v.
Hill, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 57,87 (1974).
In Kewanee this Court upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's trade
~rrret. law, although again no First. Amendment claim was presented.
Cit.ing GoldstPin. the Court stated:
''.Tu:;t as the State:; may exPrci:;e regulatory power owr writings so ma.y
1he State;; regllht.te with rP.spect to discoveries. States ma.y hold diverse
virwpoint:; in protecting intellectual property relating to invention as they
do in protecting the intellectual property rrlating to the subject matter
of copyright. Tlw only limit·a.tion on the States is that. in regulating the
area of patent:; nud copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of
the laws in thi:; area pa.ssed by Congre.ss . . . . " 416 U. S., at 479.
Although rrcognizing thnt the trade ;;ecret law resulted in preventing the
public gaining certain information, the Court emphasized tha.t. the law
hnd '' a decidedly beneficial effect. on society," id., at 485, and that without
it , ·'organized J'Cientifir and technological research could become fragmPntrd, and society, a;; a wholP, would suffPr." /d., at 487.
11
" There can be no offpn~P to t.he Constitution if the [media] is comprlled to pay tlw fair value of what it has taken . . . . " Hill, Defamation
and Privacy Undrr the First Amendment, 76 Col. L. Rev. 1205, 1276
( 19i(i) •· .\Ion' and more court s seem willing to acknowledge that· plainuff,.; whQ ,.;ur for appropriation de:;erve damage~ not becau::;e they suffered
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Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the
circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so.
Reversed.

some kind of severe mental distress but because the defendant. ·Used someth ing which belonged to the plaintiff-his name or likeneso-without
mHnner and with the same personnel as appeared on the original
recording.
" Until and unless Congl'ess takes further action with respect to recordings . . . , the California statute may be enforced against acts of piracy
-;uch as those which occurred in the present case." 412 U. S., at 571.
(Emphasi;; added.)
We note that federal district courts have rejected First Amendment
challenges to the federal copyright Jaw on the ground that "no restraint
has been placed on the use of an idea or concept." United States v.
Bodin, ;375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (SD Okla. 1974). See also Walt Disney
Productions v. Air Pimtes. 3'45 F. Supp. 108, 115 (ND Cal. 1972) (cit.i ng
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment . Guarantees of Free
Speech and Pres;, 17 U.S. L.A. L. Rev. 1180 (1970), arguing that. copynght law does not abridge the First Amendment because it does not
rc;;t rain the communication of id<'as or concepts); Robe1·t Stigwood Group,
Ltd. v. O'Reilly~ 346 F . Supp. :376 (Conn. 1972) (also relying on Nimmer) .
Of course this <':ll:l<~ does not. make a claim that. respondents would be
prevrnted by !WI itioner':s " right of publicity" from ~;ta ging or filming its
own '' human cannonbtdl" act
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MR. .JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Hugo Zacchini, is an entertainer. He performs
a "human cannonball" act in which he is shot from a cannon
mto a net some 200 feet away. Each performance occupies
some 1.5 seconds. In August and September, 1972, petitioner
was enga.ged to perform his act on a regular basis at the
Uf'auga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. He performed in a
ft' llced area, surrounded by grandstands, at the fair grounds.
Members of the public attending the fair were not charged a
separate admission fee to observe his act.
On August 30, a freelance reporter for Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Company, the operator of a television broadcasting station and respondent in this case, attended the fair.
He carried a small movie camera. Petitioner noticed the
reporter and asked him not to film the performance. The
rP porter did not do so ou that day; but on the instructions of
the producer of respondent's daily newscast, he returned the
followinp; day and videotaped the entire act. This film clip,
approximately 15 seconds in length, was shown on the 11
o 'cloek news program that night, together with favorable
<'ommeutary.1
t

The «eript of the commentary accompanying the film clip read as

1ollows :

"T!u" •

• now • • . i:; the 1>ior;. of a true spectator sport • . . the sport

~ -
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Petitioner then brou~ht this ~ction f9r dama~es, allegin~
that he i~ "engaged in the entertainment business," that the
act he performs is one "invented by his father and ... performed only by his family for the last 50 years," that
respondent 11 showed and commercialized the film of his act
without his consent," and that such conduct was an "unlawful
appropriation of plaintiff's professional property." App. 4-5.
Respondent answered and moved for summary judgment,
which was summarily granted by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed. The majority held
that petitioner's complaint stated a cause of action for conversion and for infringement of a common law copyright, and
one judge concurred in the judgment on the ground that the
complaint stated a cause of action for appropriation of petitioner's "right of publicity" in the film of his act. All three
judges agreed that the First Am.e ndment did not privilege the
press to show the entire performance on a news program
without compensating petitioner for any financial injury he
could prove at trial.
Like the concurring judge in the Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court of Ohio rested petitioner's cause of action
under state law on his "right to the publicity value of his
performance." 47 Ohio St. 2d 224,- N. E. 2d- (1976).
'The opinion Syllabus, to which we are to look for the rule of
law used to decide the case, 2 declared first that one may not
of human ca.nnonballing ... in fact., the gn•at Zacchini is about the only
human cannonball around, the:;e days .. . just happens tha.t., where he is,,
1>-< the Grrat Geauga County Fair, in Burt.on . .. and believe me, a.lthough
11',: not. a long a.rt, it':; a thriller .. . and you really need to see it in.
pPnson ... to appreciate it ... ." (Emphasis in original.) App. 12.
t Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89,93 n. 2 (1964); Perkins v. Benguet Mining
'C'o.. 342 U. S. 437 441-44:3 1(1952); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., :300
\'. S. 551, 554 (1940) . Sre Cassidy v. Glossip , 12 Ohio St. 2d 17 (1967);
The Williamson Heater Co . v. Radich, 128 Ohio St. 124 (1934); Thackery
1 Helfrich. 123 Ohio St. 334, :3:36 (1931); State v. Hauser, 101 Ohio St •.
~n~ . 408. ( 1no) ; 14 Ohio Jnx. 2d §, 247:.
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use for his own benefit the name or likeness of another,
whether or not the use or benefit is fL commercial one, and
second that respondent would be liable for the appropriation,
over petitioner's objection and without license or privilege, of
petitioner's right to the publicity value of his performance.
!bid. The court nevertheless gave judgment for respond~nt
because, in the words of the Syllabus,
" [a] TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts
matters of legitimate public interest which would otherwise be protected by an individual's right of publicity,
unless the actual intent of the TV station was to appropriate the benefit of the publicity for some nonprivileged
pri vate use , or unless the actual intent was to injure the
individual." Ibid.
We granted certiorari, U. S . - (1977) , to consider an
iss ue unresolved by this Court: whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments immunized respondent from damages for
its alleged infringement of petitioner's state law "right of
publicity." Petition for Certiorari 2. Insofl;l-r as the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution required juqgment
for respo ndent, we reverse the judgment of that court.

II
If the judgment below rested on an independent and adequate state ground, the writ of certiorari should be dismissed
as improvidently granted. Wilson v. Lowes, 355 U. S. 597
( 1958). for "our only power over state judgments is to correct
them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal laws.
And our power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise
opinio ns. We are not permitted to render an advisory opin10 11 , and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state
court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our ~eview
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion."
Hp,r{] v. Pitca.irn, 324 U. S. 117, 125-126 0945) . We p,re
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co11fident. however, that the judgment below did not rest on
an adequate and independent state ground and that we have
jurisdiction to decide the federal issue presented in this case.
There is no doubt that petitioner's complaint was grounded
.in state law and that the right of publicity which petitioner
was held to possess was a right under Ohio law. It is also
clear that respondent's claim of constitutional privilege was
sustained. The source of this privilege was not identified in
the Syllabus. It is clear enough from the opinion of the Ohio
Supreme Court, which we are permitted to consult for understanding of the Syllabus, Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342
U. S. 437, 442-443 (1952),~ that in adjudicating the crucial
question of whether respondent had a privilege to film and
televise respondent's performance, the court turned immediately to Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967). It con~I n Perkins the is;,;ue was whether the Ohio courts could exercise per;,;mwl jurisdiction over a foreign corponttion. The Syllabus of the Ohio
Suprt>me Court dt>rlared tha.t it did not have prr;;onal jurisdiction, but it
gavt> no indication of whether the Ohio court'~ decision rested on state
ground::; or on tlw Fourteenth Amendment. Thr only opinion filed with
the Syllabus rea<;oned, however, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourtrenth Amendment. prohibitrd the Ohio court.~ from exercising personal
JUrisdiction in thH1. rase. While rrcogni11ing the existence of the Ohio
;o:)yllabus rule, thi~o~ Court felt obliged ·in the~'<P circumstances to rea.ch the
merit~ of the com;titution<d i;;sue, holding that the Due Process Clause
thd not preclude the t>xerci::;e of jurisdiction . '' [F]or us to allow the
Judgment to ;;tancl a.~ it i::; would risk an affirmance of a decision which
might have been decided differently if the court below ha.d felt free, under
our deci:;ions, t.o do so." 342 U.S., a.t 443 .
The Ohio court,; do not ;;ugge:;t tha.t the opinion is not. relevant to a.
dt>termination of the Ohio Supreme Court';; holding.
"The ::;yllabu::; is the language of the court. The opinion is more
particular!~· t.he lan!);uagP of the judge preparing the same, and yet so

much of the opinion a.~ is reasonably necessary to S'ustain the judgment
m.·ust of necessity be concurred in by t/!e court·."
1/art v. Andreu•s, 103 Ohio St. 218, 221 (1921) (emphasis a.dded). S~
:d:-;o Willia'/nijon Heater, supra; .';tate v. Ha'user, supra.
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strued the principle of that case, along with that of New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 374 (1964), to be that "the press
has a privilege to report matters of legitimate publ\c interest
even though such reports might intrude on matters otherwise
private," and concluded, therefore, that the press is also
"privileged when an individual seeks to publicly exploit his
talents while keeping the benefits private." 47 Ohio St. 2d,
at 234, N. E. 2d. at - . The privilege thus exists in
cases "where the appropriation of the right of publicity is
claimed." The court's opinion a.lso referred to Draft 21 of
the relevant portion of Restatement of Torts Second, which
was understood to make room for reasonable press ~ppropria
tions by limiting the reach of the right of privacy rather than
by creating a privileged invasion. The opinion said. however,
that "the gravamen of the issue in this case is not whether the
degree of intrusion is reasonable but whether First Amendment principles require that the right of privacy gives way to
the public right to be informed of matters of public interest
and concern. The concept of privilege seems the more useful
and appropriate one." ld., at 234 11. 5., N. E. 2d, at--.
(Emphasis added.)
The controlling consideratio11 was thus one of privilege
rather than of the substantive reach of the right of publicity.
In tleciding the question, had the Ohio court rested on both
state and federal grounds, either of which would have been
dispositive. we would have had no jurisdiction. Fox Films v.
Mueller, 296 U. S. 207 (1935); Enterprise Irrigation District
v. Fanners .Mutual Canal Company, 243 U.S. 157 164 (1917).
But the opinion. like the Syllabus, did not mention the Ohio
Constitution, citing instead this Court's First Amendment
eases as controlling. It appears to us that decision was rested
solely on federal grounds. That the Ohio court might have~
but did not. invoke state law does not foreclose jurisdiction
here. Steel v. L&l'·: R . Co., 323 U. S. 192, 197 n. 1 ( 1944);
lndiau« ex rel. Anderson v. Br«nd, 303 U.S. 95,98 (1938) .

...
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If the judgment in favor of respondent must nevertheless be
understood as ultimately resting on Ohio law, it appears that
at the very least the Ohio court felt compelled by what it
understood to be federal constitutional considerations to con·strue and apply its own law in the manner it did. In this
event, we have jurisdiction and should decide the federal
issue; for if the state court erred in its understanding of our
·cases and of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, we should
so declare, leaving the state court free to decide the privilege
issue solely as a matter of Ohio law. Perkins v. Benguet
Mining Co., supra. "If the Supreme Court [of Ohio] held as
it did becaw:;e it felt under compulsion of federal law as
enunciated · by this Court so to hold, it should be relieved of
that compulsion. It should be freed to decide these suits
according to its own local law." Missouri v. Mayfield, 340
u.s. 1, 5 (1950) .

III
The Ohio Supreme Court held that respondent is constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public
interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of
publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for
!:iOtne nonprivileged purpose. If under this standard respondent had merely reported that petitioner was performing at the
fair and described or commented on his act, with or without
howing his picture on television, we would have a very different case. But petitioner is not contending that his appea~
ance at the fair and his performance could not be reported by
the press as newsworthy items. His complaint is tha
respondent filmed his entire act and displayed that film on
television for the public to see and enjoy. This, he claimed,
was an awropriat_im1 of his professional property. The Ohio·
Supreme Court agreed that petitioner had "a right of publtcity" that gave him "personal control over the commercial
display and exploitation of his personality and the exercise of
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his talents." 4 This right of "exclusive control over the p\lb1icity given to his performance" was said to be such a "valuable part of the benefit which may be attained by his talents
and efforts" that it was entitled to legal protection. It was
also observed, or at least expressly assumed, that petitioner
had not abandoned his rights by performing under the circumstances present at the Geauga County Fair Grounds.
The Ohio Supreme Court nevertheless held that the challenged invasion was privileged, saying that the press "must be
accorded broad latitude in its choice of how much it presents
of each story or incident, and of the emphasis to be given to
such presentation. No fixed standard which would bar the
press from reporting or depicting either an entire occurrence
or an entire discrete part of a public performance to be
formulated which would not unduly restrict the 'breathing
room' in reporting which freedom of the press requires." 47
Ohio St.. at 235, N. E. 2d, at - . Under this view,
respondent was thus constitutionally free to film and display
petitioner's ~.~
'Thr court rrlied on Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St.. 35, 133 N. E. 2d 340
(1956), the Syllabu:-; of which held:
''An actionable invasion of the right of privacy is the unwarranted
:1ppropriation or exploitation of one'::; per::;onality, the publicizing of one's
private affair::> with which the public has no legitimate concern, or the
wrongful intrul:'ion into one'~; private activities in such a manner as to
outragr or cauor mental ;;uffering, ~;hame or humiliation to a person or
ordinary oensibilitir:s."
Th(• court abo indicflted that the applicable principles of Ohio law were
t·hose ~;et out in Hc:>tatemrnt of Torts Second, Tentative Draft No. 13,
1967, § 252c, and the commrnts thereto, portions of which were stated in
thr footnotP::; of thr opinion. Al;;o, referring to the right as the "right of
publicity," the court quoted approvingly from Haelan Labomtories, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, luc .. 202 F. 2d 866,868 (CA2) (1952).
'' ThP court!;; explication wa.,; a.~ follows:
·The proprr >"f nuda rd must nece;;::;arily be whether the matters reported
wrr<:' of public inh·rr:>t, and if so, the pres;; will be liable for appropriation
l•f a rwrformer'" right of puhlirity only if its a.ct.ual intent was not to
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The Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on Time, Inc. v.
Hill, supra, but that· case does not mandate a meclia privilege
to televise a_ p~_me~nti~ act without his consent.
Involved in Ttriie, Inc. v. Hill was a claim under the New
York "Right of Privacy" statu~that Life Magazine, in the
course of reviewing a new play, had connected the play with a
long-past incident involving petitioner and his family and had
falsely described their experience and conduct at that time.
The complaint sought damages for humiliation and suffering
flowing from these nondefamatory falsehoods that allegedly
invaded Hill's privacy. The Court held, however, that the
opening of a new play linked to an actual incident was a
matter of public interest and that Hill could not recover without showing that the Life report was knowingly false or was
published with reckless disregard for the truth-the same·
rigorous standarq that had been applied in New York Times
v. Sullivan, supra.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, which was hotly contested and decided
by a divided court, involved an entirely different tort than
the "right of publicity" recognized by the Ohio Supreme
Court. As the opinion reveals in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court
was steeped in the literature of privacy law and was aware of
the developing distinctions and nuances in this branch of the
law. The Court, for example, cited Prosser, Handbook ofthe
report tlw perfonrumcr, but , rather, to appropriate the performance for
,.:orne othrr private u,.;e, or if the actual intent was to injure the performer.
rt might, al:;o be tlw case tha t the prcNS would be liable if it reckle:,1;ly
d i ~ rega rded contract rights existing between the plaintiff a nd a third
prrson to present the performance to tht> public, but that quest,i on is
not prr:;rntro hrrr." 47 Ohio St., a t 2:~5 ,- ~ . E . 2d, at -.
H Section 51 of t he New York Civil Hight ,.: Law provides an action for·
mjuncuon and damages fo r inva;;ion of the " right of privacy" granted by

§50:
'·A person, firm or corporation tha t uses for advertising purposes, or for·
1hr pmpo;;t>s of tra de, t he name, portrait. or picture of any living person·
wit hout ha.ving firi<t obt<linrd the written consent of such person, or if a.
'.J'I.inot: (~f hi,.: or. her T?:-t rent or: ~u a rd.i a n , is ~~·ilt y of a misdemeanor."

.f.)
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Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964), and the same author's well-known
article, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960), both of which
divided privacy into four distinct branches. 7 The Court was
aware that it was adjudicating a "false light" privacy case
involving a matter of public interest, not a case involving
"intrusion," 385 U. S., at 384--385, n. 9, "atJpropriation" of a
name or likeness for the purposes of trade, id., at 381, or
''private details" aboutJ:non-news-worthy person or event, id.,
at 383 n. 7. It is also abundantly clear that Time, Inc. v.
Hill did not involve a performer, a person with a nil-me having
commercial value, or any claim to a "right of publioity." This
discrete kind of "appropriation" case was plamly jdentified in
the literature cited by the Court 8 and had been adjudicated
in the reported cases. 0
7

'·T hr law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion. of four
different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common
name, hut ot,herwise have almost nothing in common except t.h at each
r~'prrsrnts au intrrference with the right of the plaintiff." Prosser,
Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). Thus, according to Prosser,
~orne cou rt,.; had recognized a cause of action for "intrusion" upon the
plaintiff':; s.eclusion or solitudr ; public disclosure of "private facts" about.
t lw pl11intiff's prn;onal life ; publicity that places the plaintiff in a "false
light " in the public eye; and "appropria.tion" of the plaintiff's name or
likene:;s for commercial purposes. One may be liable for "appropriation"
If' he ''pirat(.>[s] the plaintifl"s identity for some advantage of his own."
+8 Ca lif. L. Rev., at 403.
8 See, for example, Prosser, Torts, 3rd Ed. 842 (1964); Blaustein,
Privacy as an A::;pect of Human Dignity; An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
~. Y. U . L. Rev. 962, 986-991 (1964); Kalven, Privacy in Tort L'twWrre Warren a.ud Brandeis Wrong?, 31 La.w and Contemporary Problems
:~26, 331 ( 19(i6) .
"E. g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp ., 229 F. 2d 481
(CA3 1956); Sharkey v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. , 93 F. Supp. 986
(~DNY 1950); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F.
~11pp. 490 ( 1938); Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Tmnsrculio
Press Service, Inc., 165 Misc. 71, 30 N.Y. S. 159 (1937); Hogan v. A . S.
/lames & Co .. 114 U. S. P. L. Q, 314 (Pa . Ct. C. P. 1957); Myers v.
I} S. Camera Publishing Co.rp .. 167 N . Y . S. 2d 771, City Ct.. of Cit.y of
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The differences between these two torts are important.
First, the State's interests in providing a cause of action in
each instance are different. "The interest protected" in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light "is
clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental
'distress as in defamation." Prosser, supra, 48 Calif. L. Rev.,
at 400. By contrast, the State's interest in permitting a "right
of publicity" is in protecting the proprietary interest of the
individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.10 As we later note, the State's interest is closely
N. Y. (1957). The cases prior to 1961 are helpfully reviewed in Gordon,
Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
N. W. U. L. Rev. 553 (1960).
Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Cm·p., supra, involved a challenge to television exhibition of a film made of a prize fight that had
occurred some time ago. Judge Biggs, writ.ing for the Court of Appea.Is,
said at 229 F . 2d 486, 490:
"There are, speaking very generally, two polar types of cases. One
nrises when some accidental occurrence rends the veil of obscurity surrounding an average person and makes him, arguable, newsworthy. The
other type involves the appropriation of the performance or production
of u. profeSsional performer or entrepreneur. Between the two extremes
are many gradations, most involving strictly commercial exploitation of
some aspect of an individual's personality, such as his name or picture.
"The fact. is that, if a performer performs for hire, a curt~dlment., without
consideration, of his right to control his performance is a. wrong to him.
Such <t wrong vitally affects his livelihood, precisely as a trade libel, for
example, affects the earnings of a corpora.tion. If the art.istry of the
performance be used as a criterion, every judge perforce must tum
himself into a literary, theatrical or sports critic."
' 0 The Ohio Supreme Court expressed the view "that plaint.iff's claim
i,.: one for invasion of the right of privacy by appropriation, and should
he con;,;idered as such." 47 Ohio St., at 226, N. E. 2d, at - . It
•hould be noted, however, that the case before us is more limited than
f.he broad cu.tegory of law:;uits that may arise under the heading of
' 'appropriation.'' Petitioner doe:; not merely assert that some general use,
~'IJ.Ch as ad.vecti:;in& was made oi his name or likeness; he relies on the
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analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing
on the tight of the individual to reap the reward of his
endeavors and havmg little to do with protectiQg feelings or'
reputation. Second, the two torts differ in the degree to
which they intrude on dissemination of information to the
public. In "false light" cases the only way to protect th~
interests involved is to a.ttempt to minimize publication of the
damaging matter, while in "right of publicity" c~ the only
question is who gets to do the publishing. An entertainer
such as petitioner usually has no objection to the widespread
publication of his act as long as he gets the commercial benefit
of such publication. Indeed, in the present case petitioner
did not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his act; he simply
sought compensation for the broadcasf in the form of
damages.
Nor does it appear that our later cases, such as Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U. S. 3~3 (1974); and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, t24
U. S. 448 (1976); require or furnish substantial support for
the Ohio court's privilege ruling. These cases, like New York
Times, emphasize the protection extended to the press by the
First Amendment in defamation cases, particularly when suit
is brought by a public official or a public figure. N~ne of
them involve an alleged appropriation by th~ press of a. right
of publicity existing under state law.
Moreover, Time, Inc. v. Hill, New York Times, Metromedia,
Gertz, and Firestone all involved the reporting of events; in
none of them was there an attempt to broadcast or pu ish
an. .e~for which the performer ordinarily gets paid. It
is evi ent, and there is no claim here to the contrary, that
petitioner's state-law right of publicity would not serve to
prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts about
much narrower clajm that. respondent televised an entire act that he

ordinarily gets paid to perform..

::----
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petitioner's act. 11 fi'rherever the line in particular situa.tions
is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and
those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer's el!.yre ac~ without his conseng ·The
Constitution uo more prevents a State from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on
television than it would privilege respondent to film and
broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the
copyright owner, 17 U. S. C. § 101 et. seq., cf. Kalem Co. v.
Harpe1· Bros., 222 U. S. 55 (1911); Manners v. Morosco, 252
U. S. :317 (1920), or to film and broadcast a prize fight, Ettore
v. Philco 'Pelevision Broadcasting Corp., 229 F. 2d 481 (CA3
1956). or a baseball game, Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV
Broadcasti1~(! Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (WD Pa. 1938), where the
promoters or the participants had other -plans for publicizing
the event. There are ample reasons for reaching this
conclusion.
The broadcast of a film of petitioner's entire act poses a
Pro~~er, Torts, 4t.h Ed. (1971), 806-807, generalizes on the cases:
"Tiw ;.;<'w York (·uurt~ were faced very ea.rl~· with the obvious fact tha.t
J\t>W~J>HJll'r:; and magazinl',;, to ~ay nothing of radio, television and motion
picture,;, are by 110 UH-·au:; philant.hropie in:-;titutions, but are operated for
profit. ..-\,., again::;t. the coutl'ntion that everything published by these
agPneiP~ mu,.:( m·ee,;.~aril~- OE' ;for Jlltrpo,;r,.: of trade,' they were compelled
to hold t-hat then · must be ::iOil1e clo::iel' and more direct connection, beyond
the nwrr fact that rlw new,.,paJ)('r it:;elf i" ~<old; and that t.he presence of
advrrt i,;ing ma Iter in adjacrnt coiLunn::;, or cwrn the duplica.t.ion of a news
itrm for t.hr purpo~P of adve.rti;;ing the publication itself, does not ma.k e
:lily ditl'rreneP. Au,, - ot hrr conclu::;ion would in all probability have been
an liii<'Oll~litutional iJJtPrf~·rpnc·e with llw frr<·dom of the press. Accordi ng]~ -. it ha,; be.t•u Jwld I hat the. nwre incidental mcnt.ion of t.he plain (,iff's
ll:llrte in a book or a mul ion pieturc i::; not a.n iuvasion of hi~ privacy; nor
J::i the publi<'atioa of a photograph or t~ new:-;recl in which he incidentally
:tppear,;." (Foot nutt•,.. omined.)
Co!lt [Ht r<· Awrrit·an La'" 1n~l it-utt·, l{l•,;(atemenl of the Law Second, Ten tall\'!' Draft ~o . 2'2 , & li54c, Comnwnt. D.
11
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s@§.tantial threat to the economic value of that performance.
As the Ohio court recognized, this act is the product of petitioner's own talents and energy, the end result of much time,
effort and expense. Much of its economic value lies in the
"right of exclusive control over the publicity given to his
performance"; if the public can see the act for free on television they will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair.' 2 The
effect of a public broadcast of the performance is similar to
preventing petitioner from charging an admission fee. "The
rationale for [protecting the right of publicityk5 the straightforward. one of preventing unjust enrichme!!_t by the theft of
good will. No social purpose is served by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have
market value and for which he would norma.Uy pay." Kalven,
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 331 (1966). Moreovel', the broadcast of petitioner's entire performance, unlike
the unauthorized use of another's 1~e for tne rposes of
trade or the incidental use of a name or picture by the press,
goes to the heart of petitioner's ability to earn a living as an
entertainer. Thus in this case, Ohio has recognized what may
be the strongest case for a "right of publicity"-involving not
the appropriation of au entertainer's reputa-tion to ephance
the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropri~a
tion of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his
reputation in the first place.
Of course, Ohio's decision to protect petitioner's right o
publicity here •·ests on more than a desire to compensate the
performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the

r

nIt i~ po~sible, of course, that respondent's news broadcast increased
the value of petitioner's performance by stimulating the public's interest
in seeing the act live. In tim"(' circumstances, petitioner would not. be
nble to prove dnmagl·s and tim~ would not recover. But petitioner has
allrgrd that thr broadca~t mjured him to t.he extent of $25,000, App. 5,
'tnd wr thmk t.he State should be allowed to compensate this injury if
prawn.

'

.

]
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protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to
the public. This same consideration underlies the patent and
copyright laws long enforced by this Court. As the Court
stated in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954),
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfa.re
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and · useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the
services rendered."
These laws perhaps regard the "reward to the owner as
secondary consideration," United States v. Paramount Piclures, 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948), but they were "intended
definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights" in order to
afford greater encouragement to the production of works of
benefit to the public. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v.
Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939). The Constitution does not
prevent Ohio from making a similar choice here in deciding to
protect the eutertainer's incentive in order to encourage the
production of this type of work for public benefit. Cf.
Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546 (1973); Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 476 (1974). 1 ~
'" Goldstetn invoh·ed a California. sta.tute outlawing "record piracy"-the
111111111 horizPd d11plication of recording::; of performances by major musical
arti~t;,;.
P!'titioncr::; thPrr launchPd a multifaceted constitutional attack
on the :statutr, but they did uot argue that the statute violated the First
Amendmc·nt. In rrjccti ng this broad-based con:stitutional attack, this:
Court. concluded:
'The Ca liforma statutor.' · ~:;cheme evidences a legi:slative policy to prohibit
I apP piracy ' and 'rrcord Jlll'acy,' conduct that may adver::;ely affect. the<·outimH•d productiOn of npw recording:;, a largp indm;try in California.
Arrntdi\Jgly, tbr State has, hy st<1tute, given. to recordings the a.t.tributes;
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There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news,
enjoys First Amendment protection. It is also true that
e>ntertainment itself can be important news. Time, Inc. v.
Hill, supra. But it is important to note that neither the
public nor respondent will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner's performance as long as his commercial stake in his
act is appropriately recognized. Petitioner does not seek to
c>njoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply wants to
be paid for it. Nor do we think that a state-law damages
remedy against respondent would represent a species of liability without fault contrary to the letter or spirit of Gertz,
supra. Respondent knew exactly that petitioner objected to
televising his act, but nevertheless displayed the entire film.
We conclude, as have others/' that although the State of
of property. No restmint has been p'laced on the use of an idea or
concept; rather, petitioners and other individuals in precisely t.he same
eompen:sation." Pember and Teeter, Privacy in the Press Since Time v.
Hill, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 57,87 (1974).
In Kewauee this Court upheld the constitutionality of Ohio's trade
~ecret. Jaw, although again no First. Amendment clajm was presented.
CJt.ing Goldstein. the Court stated:
''.Tust a:s the States may exercise regulatory power over writings so ma.y
1he Stat('~ regula.te with re-spect to discoveries. States may hold diverse
v1rwpoint:; in protrcting intrllPctual property relating to invention as they
do in protecting the intellectual property relating to the subject matter
of rop~-right . ThP only limitation on the States is tha.t in regulating the
arra of patents nnd copyright.;; tlwy do not conflict with the operation of
thr laws in this nrea pa.;;:;Pd by Congre::;s . ... " 416 U. S., at 479.
Although recogr11zing that. the trade ;;ecret law resulted in preventing the
publir gaining cPrtain information, the Court emphasized tha.t. the la,w
hnd "a dPcidrdly bPneficial effect on society," id., at 485, and that without
it, "organizrd ::;cirntific and trchnological research could become fragmented, nnd societ~· , as a whole, would suffer." I d., at 487.
11
"There can be no offem;p to t.he Constitution if the [media] is eomlWlled to pay the fair va.luc of what. it has taken . . . ." Hill, Defamation
and Privacy Und<'r the FirH1 Amendment, 76 Col. L. Rev. 1205, 1276
( l97ti) " \Torr and more comt::; srem willing to acknowledge that plaintiff,.; who ,;up for appropriation de:serve damagrs not becau::;e they suffered
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Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the
circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so.
Reversed.

8omc kind of severe mental di~tress but because the defendant. ·Used something which belonged to the plaintiff-his name or likeness-wit.hout.
lllilnner and with the same personnel as appea.r ed on the original
recording.
'' Until and unless CongN'ss takes further action with respect to recordmgs . . . , the California statute may be enforced against acts of piracy
sueh as those which occurred in the present case." 412 U. S., at 571.
(Emphasi~; added.)
We note that federal district courts have rejected First Amendment,
cha llenges to the federal copyright law on the ground that "no restraint
has been phlCrd on the use of an idea or concept." United States v.
Bodin, ~75 F . Supp. 1265, 1267 (SD OkhL. 1974). See also Walt Disney
Productions v. Ail' Pirates. 345 F . Supp. 108, 115 (ND Cal. 1972) (citing
Nimmer, Doe~; Copyright Abridge First Amendment . Guarantees of Free
Speech and Pres~;, 17 U.S. L.A. L. Rev . 1180 (1970), arguing that. copynght law doe:; not abridge the First Amendment because it does not
restrain the communication of ideas or concepts); Robe1·t Stigwood G1'oup,
Ud. v . O'Reilly , 346 F . Supp. 376 (Conn. 1972) (also .relying on Nimmer).
Of cour:<e thi~; f':lti<' does not. make a claim that respondents would be
pn'v<'nted by petitioner's "right of publicity" from staging or filming it~
•)Wll ''h.uman cannonhtlll" act.
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that respondent's telecast
of the "human cannonball" was a privileged invasion of
'

petitioner's common law "right of publicity" because respondent's
•
actual intent was neither (a) to appropriate the benefit of the

*-I

publicity for a private use, nor (b) to injure petitioner.As I read the State court's explanation of the limtis

on the concept of privilege, they define the substantive reach
of a common law tort rather than anything I recognize as a limit
on a federal constitutional right.

The decision was unquestionably

influenced by the Ohio court's proper sensitivity to First Amendment principles, and to this Court's cases construing the First
Amendment; indeed, I must confess that the opinion can be read as
resting entirely on federal constitutional grounds.

Nevertheless,

the basis of the State court's action is sufficiently doubtful
that I would remand the case to that court for clarification of
its holding before deciding the federal constitutional issue.

~/

Paragraph 3 of thecourt' s syllabus reads. as follows:
"A TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts matters of legitimate public interest which
would otherwise be protected by an individual's
right of publicity, unless the actual intent of the
TV station was to appropriate the benefit of the
publicity for some non-privileged private use, or
unless the actual intent was to injure the individual."

In its opinion, the court described the "proper standard" in language
which I read as defining the boundaries of a common law tort:
"The proper standard must necessarily be whether the
matters reported were of public interest, and if so,
the press will be liable for appropriation of a performe~\s r~ght of publ~c~ty only ~f ~ts ~ctual intent
was not to report the performance, but rather, to
appropriate the performance for some other 9rivate
use, or if the actual intent was to injure the performer.
It might also be the case that the press
would be liable if it recklessly disregarded contract
rights existing betwee n the plaintiff and a third
person to 9resent th e performance to the public, but
that question is not presented her e ."
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MR. JusTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that respondent's telecast
of the "human cannonball" was a privileged invasion of
petitioner's common law "right of publicity" because repondent's actual intent was neither (a) to appropriate the
benefit of the publicity for a private use, nor (b) to injure
petitioner.*
As I read the state court's explanation of the limits on
the concept of privilege, they define the substantive reach
of a common law tort rather than anything I recognize as
*Paragraph 3 of the court's syllabus reads as follows :
"A TV ::;tation has a privilep;r to report in its newscasts matters of legitimate pubEc interest which would otherwise be protected by an individual's right of publicity, unless the actual intrnt of the TV station was to
app ropriatr the benefit of the publicity for some non-privileged private
use, or unl ess the actual intrnt was to injure the individual."
In it::; opinion, the court dei:icribrd the "proper standard" in language which
I read as defining the boundarie~ of a common law tort:
"Thr proper sta ndard must nece~sarily be whether the mat.ters reported
wrn· of public interr::;t, and if ,;o, the prrss will be liable for appropriation
of a. performer's right of publicity only if it s act ual intent was not to report the performance , but rnthrr, to approp riatr th<' performance for some
A_ oth<).privat(' u ~r. or if lhr adunl intent wa::; to injure the performer. It
( l..:.,rlnight abo br thr ca::;e that tlw prr:-;::; would be liable if it recklessly disregarded cont ract right::; exi::;ting bet ween I hr plaintiff and a third person to
prrsrm. the performance to thr public, but that qucst.ion is not presented
here."

~·
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a limit on a federal constitutional right. The decision was
unquestionably influenced by the Ohio court's proper sensitivity to First Amendment principles, and to this Court's cases
construing the First Amendment; indeed, I must confess that
the opinion can be read as resting entirely on federal constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, the basis of the state court's
action is sufficiently doubtful that I would remand the case
to that court for clarification of its holding before deciding
the federal constitutional issue.

dm/ss
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No. 76-577 ZACCHINI v. SCRIPPS-HOWARD
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
Disclaiming any attempt to do much more than
decide the narrow case before us, the Court reverses the
decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio based on repeated
~iW~.~It.
incantation of aAformula:

"a performer's entire act."

Its holding is summed up in one sentence:

"Wherever the line in particular situations
is to be drawn between media reports that are
protected and those that are not, we are quite
sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not immunize the media when they broadcast
a performer's entire act without his consent."
Ante, at 120

q

eea&t;±ffl

Uhi!il Pii 1

I

l'i!Qdenee

that this

formula provides a standard clear enough even for
1

resolution of this case.

But in any event I

believe the Court is insufficiently sensitive to the First
Amendment values at stake, and I therefore dissent.
Respondent used the film of petitioner's
performance strictly as a routine part of its regular news
program.

Today's decision permitting recovery therefore

casts a cloud over the daily editorial choices of every

2.

television news editor.

Each time he receives film

4}~~¢

~

,,'.,

footage~~

a local fair, a circus, or

even~

a

~:-~-

dramatic production made up of short one act F*•ys - to

"

offer only a few examples - he will have to take extra
precautions to determine whether any of the segments might
OU.,...rwi~e.
,
be held to portray a performer's entire act~ ~A he leavj(

-he,(,.., i\,·""
the ~station

open to liability for substantial

2

damages.

This is so even if he intends to use the

footage only for a brief portion of a regular news
€iveR tAe preBBY£9 e£ eeaeliAe&. ~ditors

program.

c:

frequently will be unable to do adequate checking before
show time, and consequently they often will choose not to
run clearly newsworthy but chancy items.
station

r•f't

, e.
0'\11\
willAMentie~ the

Or perhaps the

event, but it will confine itself

to verbal

presentatio~ccompanied
)

picture.

The public is then the loser.

perhaps by a still
This is hardly

r
the ~~et news rep~age that the First Amendment is meant
to foster.

See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.

Tornillo, 418

u.s.,

241, 257-258 (1974); Time, Inc. v.

Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389
Sullivan, 376

u.s.

(1967); New York Times Co. v.

254, 270-272, 279

Ca_f;~.~~;-. __, '$"1 V. S. I'{~

ISO

(1964) ~

C.t. S~..H...\J .

·1~-y (Itt~) .

These probable consequences reveal another
problem with the Court's

approac~

;{t does not take

3.

adequate account of the unique requirements of this

e

3

particular medium, teljvision news programs.

Such

programs exist largely to bring movie footage to the
viewers - to present the news of the day with an immediacy
and

considered his act a newsworthy event.
~ae

•..

eet~era~e

l!noad latitude 'ee 8eei8e ubat manner e£

we~ld

ptot~iee

a~

~art

9reaeeaoe,

of

it

(

e~•

rec~J
was hardly a surprise

tha~a

television

statio~

chose

~s~~
to report eA 'k' event by means of film coverage.
A

Given

this choice, meaningful presentation practically required
a film clip of the length employed here, and the station
simply is not responsible for the fact that petitioner's
happens to last only 15 seconds.

~s t I\M. ~"

:"'

-+i..A.:e.

decision promotes liability rules that

c. ko-.rD- c.~
deprive this medium of itsAftfttPral
~

The Court's

c.: ,-c WII\S ~ ~ ~ ~"''•

ine~itably

t'&po"t~

tend to

r: s+.'t..,.. ~-t'Qcl
a~preach

siiLRl

ue• J'i - whenever the subject of the news reporting is a

short performance.
The First Amendment stands guard against this
kind of

~nfinement

of a news medium, and I am convinced

that it commands a different analytical starting point
from the one selected by the Court.

Rather than begin

4.

with a quantitative analysis of the performer's behavior is this or is this not his entire act? - we should direct
initial attention to the actions of the news media:
use did the station make of the film footage?

what

When a film

is used, as here, for a routine portion of a regular news
program, I would hold that the First Amendment protects
the station from a "right of publicity" or "appropriation"
4

suit, absent a truly extraordinary showing by the
plaintiff that the news broadcast was a

sub~erfuge
'-'

permitting private or commercial exploitation.

5

Since the film clip here was undeniably treated as news
and since there is no claim that the news use was
subterfuge, respondent's action were constitutionally
protecte t;) r... respectfpl 1.y di •sent.
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Zacchini footnotes

N-1
l.

I have never witnessed a human cannonball

performance, and the record does not supply a sufficiently
detailed description to know for sure, but I would be
surprised if the "act" commences only with the explosion
that launches petitioner on his

wa ~ending

landing in the net a few seconds later.

with the

I would guess

there is some fanfare, probably stretched over as many
minutes as possible, to heighten the audience's
anticipation:

introduction of the performer, last-minute

checking of the apparatus, suiting up, and lastly entry
into the cannon, all accompanied by suitably ominous
commentary from the master of ceremonies.

If this is

found to be the case on remand, then respondent could not
be said to have appropriated the "entire act" in its
15-second newsclip - and the Court's opinion then would
afford no guidance whatever for resolution of the case.
Moreover, in future cases involving other kinds of
performances, I would expect similar difficulties in

determining just what constitutes the "entire
2.

acJ[}
's
'

that the cause of

-+o

r::

At some points the Court seems to acknowledge
action ~~

a right of

""'-s'
L

publicityAr~e~

fl("t:.Je-k

~~-~8

aheaq

t!:hee unjust enr ichmentG}: s e:Ae~re8y !'r~-:eRees~

N-2
See,~-~·'

ante, at 13.

But the remainder of the opinion

s

inconsistently accepts a measure of damag~based not on
the defendant's enhanced profits but on harm to the
plaintiff regardless of any gain to the defendant.
~-~.,

ante, at 13, n. 12.

See,

Indeed, in this case there is

no suggestion whatever that respondent television station
gained a single penny based on the showing of petitioner's
flight

(although it no doubt received its normal

advertising revenue for the news program - revenue it
y\0

~ .. ,...

c4l...:.cl...

would have received Are~a!!elle~~ o£
appeared).

lih~e

news i terns

Nevertheless, in the unlikely event that

petitioner can prove that his income was somehow reduced
as a result of the broadcast, respondent will apparently

t

have to compensate him
3.

for ~

difference.

In another important First Amendment case

arising in a somewhat different context, the Court was
careful to note:
"Nor does it follow that motion pictures are
necessarily subject to the precise rules
governing any other particular method of
expression. Each method tends to present its
own peculiar problems." Joseph Burst*n, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 u.s. 495, 503 (1952) (emp asis
added). See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC
395 u.s. 367, 386-387 (1969).

N-3
when a suit is based instead on "intrusion" or publication
of "private details."

See ante, at 9: Prosser, Privacy,

48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960).

u.s.

Inc., 418

323 (1974)

Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch,

(clarifying the different

standards required in defamation suits, depending on
whether or not the plaintiff is a public figure(.U

'\b. -+t..t.

In an

~ lo.&~e. ~$ ~

"appropriation" or "right of publicity" suitA the
plaintiff IJ£ ' !all) does not complain about the fact of
publication, but rather about its timing or manner.

-:Bv..~

""-v ,·~

~ ~.Q....
·,"' VVVof

O.tM\~t~

seeks to retain control over these aspects in order to

pJGl:c..)

v.· t.w k
G4\l\S

keep the monetary benefits that flow from such

i~~

wat"- ~ ~rc4

N>~II-U)

In the other causes of action, the plaintiff

publication.

"

~

~~""~~

ot

He

f'O~N.

~~ r~ror~ .

generally seeks to avoid any sort of public exposure.

~s ~
~Athe

suit is for "intrusion" or publication of

"private details91 the existence of constitutional
privilege is much less likely to turn on whether the media
used the information in a news broadcast or in some other
.;..,~••est"
fashion~ ~s~i~R~e~e~e~~~.e~~~~l~ani~t~
t l~t~
' £~f~'••-A~J~i~g~s._ii~n~~~r~e~o~e~R~e~i~ft~~~a~~~

Bt! ~ I simply
are express Re

e~inien

hF~·
ilOLE e8e ~9e9Aeial giffiliHlA8@8

Oil the proper et!esemg in

iiWQA

a

-ease .
5.

Perhaps this is not far different from the

standard employed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in its

N-4
CAS~

holding quoted ante, at 3.

But thisAdoes not require any

detailed specification of when liability may be imposed
despite ostensible news use, since there is no claim here
that the news use was anything but bona fide.

I would

emphasize, however, that selling time during a news
broadcast to advertisers in the customary

0 \,viov~(y

fashion~does

not

make for 'bommercial exploitation'\ in the sense intended
here.

See Prosser, Torts 806-807

(4th ed. 1971).

York Times v. Sullivan, supra, at 266.

Cf. New

'-

..§u:prmtt <!fourt of tlrt ~nitt~ ..§taUs

';Was!ringhm. lfl. <!f.

2.ll,?J!.~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 17, 1977

Re:

J

76-577 - Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.

Dear Byron:
I join. If the longhand note on the attached
copy of page 7 interests you, I grant you the
right to copy my entire "performance" sans
royalties.

egards,GJ

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

dm/ss
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No. 76-577 ZACCHINI v. SCRIPPS-HOWARD
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
Disclaiming any attempt to do much more than
d e cide the narrow case before us, the Court reverses th'e
d ec ision of the Supreme Court of Ohio based on r e peated

5;~~1e.
incantation of aAformula:

"a performer's entire act."

Its holding is summ e d up in one sentence:

"Wherever the line in particular situations
is to be drawn between media reports that are
protected and those that are not, we are quite
sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not immunize the media when they broadcast
a performer's entire act without his consent."
Ante, at 120

formula provides a standard clear enough even for
1

resolution of this case.

But in any event I

believe the Court is insufficiently sensitive to the First
Amendment values at stake, and I therefore dissent.
film<S.tpet±tion~

Respondent used the

-- ~

. .

performance str ictl'Sr -a.s._ a routine part_ of · its regular news

C .

program.

·----

-

~-

.

---.--

Today's decisioi permittirig re~overy _ therefore
~,.....

---....__

~~-

-- -- ~--...._
~
,....,-,..,.~
casts a~otid_ . .?v,er ~the daily editorial choices _ot: __ ~~~ry - /

-2-

Although the Court lumps the cases together, ante, at
12, ~~B respondent's action here is by no means comparable
to an unconsented

D(: commercial

broadcast of a

~

prize

fight or a baseball game, wherein the broadcaster keeps
the profits and refuses to share them with the performers.
There is no suggestion here that respondent made any such
special use of the film.

Instead, it simply reported on

what petitioner concedes to be a newsworthy event, in a
way hardly surprising for a television station -- by
means of film coverage.

The report was an ordinary part

of an ordinary daily news program, consuming a total of
15 seconds.

-)-

$
It is the purest example of the press fulfilling the

~+~lovteL
informing func tionl\

en;~;r.isage6

for it

~p

in our First

Amendment system of free expression.

kcfel:~

~~-rhe Courts~~ A that the station's ordinary

liabilit~as

news report may give rise to substantial
disturbing implications, for the decision
lead to a

1

will~

degree of media self-censorship.

California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-154 (1959).

inevitably
•

Cf. Smith v.

t.

Wh:n~er

a

~

television news editor is unsure whethr

~~film

{Q.C.f2iv~ ~c....~~

footage

3./

he hasA might be held to portray an "entire act, "..,;;:.1
he is now encouraged to decline coverage--even of clearly

--fk
newsworthy events--or else to

br-o~CA~t

confineAh±msel~

to watered-

down verbal reporting, perhaps with an occasional still
picture.

The public is then the loser.

This is hardly

the kind of robust news reportage that the First Amendment
is meant to foster.

See generally Miami Herald Publishing

-

Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-258 (1974); Time, Inc.
v.

~'

385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); New York Times Co. v.

Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270-272, 279 (1964).
---.
.
In my view
~

the~

First Amendment commands a different

analytical starting point from the one selected

by the Court.

Rather than begin

- ¥with a quanti~ative analysis of the performer's behavior 1s this or is this not his entire act? - we should direct
initial attention to the actions of the news media:
use did the station make of the film footage?

what

When a film

is used, as here, for a routine portion of a regular news
program, I would hold that the First Amendment protects
the station from a "right of publicity" or "appropriation"

•

suit, absent a truly extraordinary snowing by the

sub~erfuge

plaintiff that the news broadcast was a
permitting private or commercial

'--'

exploitation.~

and

/

''

/

-5I emphasize that this is an "appropriation" suit,
rather than one of the other varietees of ~l\X

~fright

of privacy" tort suits delineated by Dean Prosser in his

classic article.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev.
~ c.o ti 'l:i-\;; ;""+e ~~. ~ a.v--t. c.cv.s M.u ll>lr. ,t.·f¥ c.r e.4":

383 (1960).

In those other causes of

action~fhe

plaintiff

generally seeks to avoid any sort of public exposure, and
tS

the existence of constitutional privilege

~ieaxx±ikei~a¥~ess

~Atherefore

likay to turn on whether the

publication occurred in a news broadcast or in some other
fashion.

In a suit like the one before us, however, the

exposure to tre public,
plaintiff does not complain about the fact of/kx~Mkli«aki8n
but rather about its timing or manner.

He seeks to

retain control over those aspects in order to keep the
monetary
hav~ng

~

benefits that flow from such publication.

But

in essence,
made the matter public -- having chosen,/kkakxix~

to make it newsworthy -- he cannot,consistently with
the First Amendment, complain of routine news reportage.
Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(clarifying the diffennt liability standards appropriate
in defamation suits, depending on whether or not the
plaintiff is a public figure).
Since the film • clip here was undeniably treated as
news and since there is no claim that the news use was
subterfuge, respondent's actions were constitutionally
~privileged.

I would affirm.

6/14/77

Zacchini footnotes

N-1 ·

1.

I have never witnessed a human cannonball

performance, and the record does not supply a sufficiently
detailed description to know for sure, but I would be
surprised if the "act" commences only with the explosion
that launches petitioner on his

wa~ending

with the

I would guess

landing in the net a few seconds later.

there is some fanfare, probably stretched over as many
minutes as possible, to heighten the :audience's
anticipation:

introduction of the performer, last-minute

checking of the apparatus, suiting up, and lastly entry
into the cannon, all accompanied by suitably ominous
commentary from the master of ceremonies.

If this is

found to be the case on remand, then respondent could not
be said to have appropriated the "entire act" in its
15-second newsclip- and the Court's opinion then would
afford no guidance whatever for resolution of the case.
Moreover, in future cases involving other kinds of
performances, I would expect similar difficulties in

determining just what constitutes the "entire
2.

actf.&

At some points the Court seems to acknowledge

~ k~~
that the cause of

action~~

a right of

;s

kr.-r

publicityArest~

~

--fo f'tt.v~
A

~-tho~

unjust enrichment~c thereby-pfevente~

N-2
See,~-~.,

ante, at 13.

But the remainder of the opinion

s
inconsistently' accepts - a measure of darriageJ based not on
the defendant's enhanced profits but on harm to the
plaintiff regardless of any gain to the defendant.
~-~.,

~nte ,

at 13, n. 12.

See,

Indeed, in this case there is

no suggestion whatever that respondent television station
gained a single penny based on the showing of petitioner's
flight

(although it no doubt received its normal

advertising revenue for the news progTam - revenue it
V\0

v-Jf e r- w{__; d._

receivedA~~~l~-of-wh~t

would have
appeared).

news items

Nevertheless, in the unlikely event that

petitioner can prove that his income was somehow reduced
as a result of the broadcast, respondent will apparently

-t

have to compensate him

.

for~

difference.

I~mportant

a r i / g inyomewhat di 2rent
ar

0

note:

First Amendment case

conte~t

was

3.

Such doubts might arise when the editor receives

film footage f of an event at a local fair, a circus,
or a dramatic production made up of short xk skits, to
offer only a few examples.

4.

~a

This case does not require any detailed

~ "So~S ~ ..¢e~ \~:~;~

4.

specification ofA~R~~~i~4~~-may-be-i~pose~s~~~

sv-1~J
e-s-t:ensi.bire

-ew

~

responsent's news use

sinc,there
was~

I would point out, however,

is no claim here that

anything but bona fide.

that selling time during a

news broadcast to advertisers in tre

customary fashion

obviously does not make for "commercial exploitation"
in the sense intended here.
(4th ed. 1971).
at 266.

See Prosser, Torts 806-807

Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra,
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ZACCHINI v. SCRIPPS-HOWARD

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
Disclaiming any attempt to do more than decide the
narrow case before us, the Court reverses the decision of
the Supreme Court of Ohio based on repeated incantation of
a single formula :"a performer's entire act."

The holding

today is summed up in one sentence:
"Wherever the line in particular situations
is to be drawn between media reports that are
protected and those that are not, we are quite
sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
do not immunize the media when they broadcast
a performer's entire act without his consent."
Ante, at 12.
I doubt that this formula provides a standard clear enough
1
even for resolution of this case.
In any event, I am not
persuaded that the Court's opinion is appropriately sensitive
to the First Amendment values at stake, and I therefore
dissent.

2.
Although the Court would draw no distinction, ante,
at 12, I do not view respondent's action as comparable to
unauthorized commercial broadcasts of sporting events,
theatrical performances, and the like where the broadcaster keeps the profits.

There is no suggestion

here that respondent made any such use of the film.

Instead,

it simply reported on what petitioner concedes to be a
newsworthy event, in a way hardly surprising for a television
station - by means of film coverage.

The report was part

of an ordinary daily news program, consuming a total of 15
seconds.

It is a routine example of the press fulfilling

the informing function so vital to our system.
The Court's holding that the station's ordinary news
report may give rise to substantial liability has disturbing
2

implications, for the decision could lead to a degree of
media self-censorship.
147, 150-154 (1959).

Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
Hereafter, whenever a television news

editor is unsure whether certain film footage he has received
3

from a camera crew might be held to portray an "entire act,"
he may decline coverage - even of clearly newsworthy events or confine the broadcast to watered-down verbal reporting,
perhaps with an occasional still picture.
then the loser.

The public is

This is hardly the kind of news reportage

that the First Amendment is meant to foster. See generally

. '

l

I

3.
Miami Herald Publishing Co . v. Tornillo, 418 U.S . 241, 257258 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-272, 279
(1964).
In my view the First Amendment commands a different
analytical starting point from the one selected by the Court.
Rather than begin with a quantitative analysis of the
performer's behavior - is this or is this not his entire
act? - we should direct initial attention to the actions
of the news media:
film footage?

what use did the station make of the

When a film is used, as here, for a routine

portion of a regular news program, I would hold that the
First Amendment protects the station from a "right of
publicity" or "appropriation" suit, absent a strong showing
by the plaintiff that the news broadcast was a subterfuge
4
or cover for private or commercial exploitation.
I emphasize that this is an "appropriation" suit,
rather than one of the other vatieties of "right of privacy"
tort suits delineated by Dean Prosser in his classic
article. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
other
In those/causes of action the competing interests are
considerably different.

The plaintiff generally seeks

to avoid any sort of public exposure, and the existence
of constitutional privilege is therefore less likely to

4.
turn on whether the publication occurred in a news broadcast or in some other fashion.

In a suit like the one

before us, however, the plaintiff does not complain about
the fact of exposure to the public, but rather about its
timing or manner.

He welcomes some publicity, but seeks to

retain control over means and manner as a way to maximize
for himself the monetary benefits that flow from such
publication.

But having made the matter public - having

chosen, in essence, to make it newsworthy - he cannot,
consistently with the First Amendment, complain of routine
news reportage.

Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.

323 (1974) (clarifying the different liability standards
appropriate in defamation suits, depending on whether, or
not the plaintiff is a public figure).
Since the film clip here was undeniably treated as
news and since there is no claim that the news use was
subterfuge, respondent's actions were constitutionally
privileged.

I would affirm.

6/20/77
Zacchini footnotes

N-1
1.

Although the record is not explicit,it is unlikely

that the "act" commenced abruptly with the explosion that
launched petitioner on his way, ending with the landing
in the net a few seconds later.
actual

One may assume that the

firing ' was preceded by some fanfare, possibly

stretching over several minutes, to heighten the audience's
anticipation :

introduction of the performer, description

of the uniqueness and danger, last-minute checking of the
apparatus, ,and entry into the cannon, all accompanied

by

suitably ominous commentary from the master of ceremonies.
If this ·'.is found to be the case on remand, then respondent
could not be said to have appropriated the "entire act"
in its 15-second newsclip - and the Court's opinion then
would afford no guidance for resolution of the case.
Moreover, in future cases involving different performances,
similar difficulties in determining just what constitutes
the "entire act" are inevitable.
2.

At some points the Court seems to acknowledge

that the reason for recognizing a cause of action asserting
a "right of publicity" is to prevent unjust enrichment.
See,

~·&·,

ante, at 13.

But the remainder of the opinion

inconsistently accepts a measure of da mages based not on
the defendant's enhanced profits but on harm to the

N-2
plaintiff regardless of any gain to the defendant.
~.g.,

ante, at 13, n.l2.

See,

Indeed, in this case there is

no suggestion that respondent television station gained
financially by showing petitioner's flight (although it no
doubt received its normal advertising revenue for the
news program - revenue it would have received no matter
which news items appeared).

Nevertheless, in the unlikely

event that petitioner can prove that his income was somehow
reduced as a result of the broadcast, respondent will
apparently have to compensate him for the difference.
3o

Such doubts are especially likely to arise when

the editor receives film footage of an event at a local
fair, a circus, a sports competition of limited duration
(e.g., the winning effort in a ski-jump competition),
or a dramatic production made up of short skits, to
offer only a few examples.
4.

This case requires no detailed specification of

the standards for identifying a subterfuge, since there is no
claim here that respondent's news use was anything but
bona fide.

Cf. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, ___ , N.E.2d

___ (the standards suggested by the Supreme Court of Ohio,
quoted ante, at 3).

I would point out, however, that selling

time during a news broadcast to advertisers in the customary
fashion does not make for "commercial exploitation" in the
sense intended here.
197l)o

See Prosser, Torts 806-807 (4th ed.

Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 266.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR.
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RE: No. 76-577 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your dissent in the above.

SA)
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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Please join me.
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Mr. Justice Powell
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